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POLICE DISCRETION NOT TO INVOKE THE CRIMINAL
PROCESS: LOW-VISIBILITY DECISIONS IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
JOSEPH GOLDSTEINt
POLICE decisions not to invoke the criminal process I largely determine the
outer limits of law enforcement. By such decisions, the police define the anbit
of discretion throughout the process of other decisionmakers-prosecutor,
grand and petit jury, judge, probation officer, correction authority, and parole
and pardon boards. These police decisions, unlike their decisions to invoke
the law, are generally of extremely low visibility and consequently are seldom
the subject of review. Yet an opportunity for review and appraisal of non-
enforcement decisions is essential to the functioning of the rule of law in our
system of criminal justice.2 This Article will therefore be an attempt to deter-
,Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
This Article was suggested by discussions during a seminar on Research in Criminal
Law Administration conducted under a grant from the Ford Foundation during the sum-
mer of 1958 at the University of Wisconsin Law School. With Herman Goldstein of the
Public Administration Service in Chicago, to whom I am especially indebted, I was re-
sponsible for leading discussion on police activity. Other participants in the seminar, for
whose comments I am grateful, were Professors Francis Allen of the University of Chi-
cago Law School, Richard Cloward of the New York School of Social Work, William
Burnett Harvey of the University of Michigan Law School, Lloyd Ohlin of the New
York School of Social Work, and Frank Remington of the University of Visconsin Law
School. I am also appreciative of the contributions made by many of my students in my
courses in Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure.
1. "Invocation is the task of the officers concerned with law enforcement who . . .
-must provisionally assess whether a given act contravenes the . . . (criminal] code and
initiate a demand for application." LAsswEL., THE DEcIsiox Paoczss 3 (1956). 2\ore
abstractly, the invocation function of the decision process is defined: "provisional charac-
terizations of conduct according to prescriptions, including demand for application." Id.
at 2. Professor Lasswell has broken the decision process down into seven components:
intelligence, recommendation, prescription, invocation, application, apprasal, and termina-
tion. Ibid.
2. A judge dismissing criminal charges without trial, upon his own motion, must re-
cord his reasons so that all may know why this great power was exercised, and
such public declaration is indeed a purposeful restraint, lest magistral discretion
sweep away the government of laws.
People v. Vinters, 342 P2d 538, 542 (Cal. Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1959). See also Jaffe,
The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HAv. L. REv. 401 (1958).
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mine how the visibility of such police decisions may be increased and what pro-
cedures should be established to evaluate them on a continuing basis, in the
light of the complex of objectives of the criminal law and of the paradoxes
toward which the administration of criminal justice inclines.
I
The criminal law is one of many intertwined mechanisms for the social
control of human behavior.3 It defines behavior which is deemed intolerably
disturbing to or destructive of community values and prescribes sanctions
which the state is authorized to impose upon persons convicted or suspected
of engaging in prohibited conduct.4 Following a plea or verdict of guilty, the
3. The criminal law may increase, decrease, or leave unaffected the impact on in-
dividual behavior, if any, of family, education, religion, "civil" law, the arts, science, free-
dom, mass communication, economic conditions, local, state, national, foreign and inter-
national governing bodies, and membership or nonmembership in many other formal and
informal, large and small, groups including unions, country clubs, and gangs.
For recognition that the criminal law -is but a piece in the mosaic of social controls,
see 544 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 500-01 (1958) (remarks of R. A. Butler, Secretary of State
for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal, in debate on improving Britain's penal
system). On the need for a law of crimes as a means of controlling human behavior even
in an anarchist society see RUSSELL, RoADs TO FREEDox 130-36 (1918).
4. Sanctions are imposed by the state presumably against, or' at least without regard
to, the wishes of the individual being deprived. Implicit in the word "sanction," as used
in this Article, is involuntariness. In this context involuntariness is not treated as a psy-
chological concept. Thus, for example, imprisonment is a sanction even if imposed on a
person who commits a crime in order to be punished or in order to 6scape cold and hun-
ger in the "warmth" of a jail. See 4 FREuD, COLLECTED PAPERS 342 (Riviere transl.
1949) ; Levinson, Criminality From a Sewe of Guilt: A Case Study and Some Research
Hypotheses, 20 J. PsRSONALIxr 402 (1952) ; ALEXANDER & STAUB, The Psychodynamics
of the Case of Mine. Lefebvre, in THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC 175
(rev. ed. 1956) ("The punishment [death commuted to life imprisonment] imposed upoli
her 'by a court of justice Mme. Lefebvre perceives as a benefaction; . .. for through this
punishment she rids herself of the last remnant of the sense of guilt . ..") ; Momius,
THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL 338 (1951). In Commonwealth v. Chester, 337 M1fass. 702, 710,
150 N.E.2d 914, 918 (1958), after court's charge to jury, the defendant In a statement
to the jury said: "It is my opinion that any decision other than guilty, guilty of murder
in the first degree, with no recommendation for leniency, is a miscarriage of justice."
After the judge imposed the death sentence the defendant said: "Thank you." Following
commutation of the death sentence, he committed suicide. See also In the Matter of
Davies, Conn. Bd. Pardons, Oct. 19, 1959, pp. 62-63, in which the petitioner, sentenced
to death, closed the hearing, after a lengthy plea by counsel and the introduction of much
psychiatric testimony, by saying:
Gentlemen, first of all, I want to thank my friends for the efforts they gave to me.
In my opinion, I think I got a fair trial and I think I should die for what I did.
And I would like to stand on my Constitutional rights, and die for what I did.
Compulsory commitment for treatment whether by civil or criminal proceeding, and
for whatever state objective, is a sanction so far as the person committed is concerned.
See Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (sex psychopathy) ; Moore v.
Draper, 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952) (tuberculosis).
[Vol. 69: 543
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state deprives offenders of life, liberty, dignity, or property through convic-
tions, fines, imprisonments, killings, and supervised releases, and thus seeks
to punish, restrain, and rehabilitate them, as well as to deter others from
engaging in proscribed activity. Before verdict, and despite the presumption
of innocence which halos every person, the state deprives the suspect of life,
liberty, dignity, or property through the imposition of deadly force, search
and seizure of persons and possessions, accusation, imprisonment, and bail,
and thus seeks to facilitate the enforcement of the criminal law.5
These authorized sanctions reflect the multiple and often conflicting pur-
poses which now surround and confuse criminal law administration at and
between key decision points in the process. The stigma which accompanies
conviction, for example, while serving a deterrent, and possibly retributive,
function, becomes operative upon the offender's release and thus impedes the
rehabilitation objective of probation and parole.0 Similarly, the restraint func-
5. On deadly force see, Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 491-92, 45 A.2d
235, 238 (1946) ("an officer endeavoring to make an arrest in case of a felony, may use all
the force necessary to overcome resistance, even to taking ... [a] life"); 'MoDL P-MA.
CODE § 3.07 & comments (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958); Beale, Justification for Injury, 41
HAav. L. REv. 553, 556-57 (1928).
On bail as a device for supervising released suspects and the use of deadly force by surety
to regain custody of principal, see State v. Lingerfelt, 109 N.C. 775, 778, 14 S.E. 75, 77
(1891) ("The bail have their principal on a string, and may pull the string whenever they
please... !'). See also United States v. Field, 190 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1951).
On accusation and bail, see The Eye Opener, Nov. 1958, p. 1, coL 3 (publication of
the inmates of Oklahoma State Penitentiary) :
Occasionally, an innocent man is charged, arrested and tried for a crime against
the community. When this happens, and the jury exonerates the accused, the man
is released with an apology from the court.
Is an apology enough? Consider that the defendant must pay all attorney costs,
bail bond and has forfeited weeks and sometimes months of job pay which he can-
not reclaim. His reputation may be offended because accusations by the Police often
are accepted as guilt upon the defendant.
We do not think such men, when freed by juries, are entitled to lifetime endow-
ment for this miscarriage of justice; but we do believe they should not be made
paupers by the expense of paying for the defense. liany an innocent man has spent
his life's savings to prove such a small thing as "mistaken identity."
On imprisonment, see Sellin, Imprisonment, 7 Eqcyc. Soc. Sc. 616 (1932) :
In one of its oldest forms, the, origin of which is lost in antiquity, [imprison-
ment] is used for the custody of persons accused of offenses against custom or
statute law. In some states this remained until relatively recent times as almost the
only form of imprisonment. As late as 1771 the French jurist Jousse stated that
prison was used only to hold criminals before trial and not to punish them even in
case of crime.
See Application of Johnson, 340 P.2d 585 (Nev. 1959), where ten months in prison
awaiting trial was deducted from time to be served under sentence imposed. See also
Application of United Elec. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), on the
"punishment of public reprimand" by a grand jury presentment which accuses without
indicting.
6. On stigma, status degradation, and the need for designing and establishing status-
eleation as a part of the criminal process, see APPENDIX 1, infra at 590.
1960]
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tion of imprisonment involves the application of rules and procedures which,
while minimizing escape opportunities, contributes to the deterioration of of-
fenders confined for reformation.7 Since police decisions not to invoke the
7. See, e.g., SYKES, THE SocIETY OF CAPTiVES 73, 75-76 (1958):
Regulation by a bureaucratic staff is felt far differently than regulation by custom.
... Most prisoners express an intense hostility against their far-reaching depend-
ence on the decisions of their captors and the restricted ability to make choices
must be included among the pains of imprisonment along with restrictions of phys-
ical liberty, the -possession of goods and services, and heterosexual relationships.
The important point, however, is that the frustration of the prisoner's ability to
make choices and the frequent refusals to provide an explanation for the regula-
tions and commands descending from the bureaucratic staff involve a profound
threat to the prisoner's self image because they reduce the prisoner to the weak,
helpless, dependent status of childhood . . . the imprisoned criminal finds his pic-
ture of himself as a self-determining individual being destroyed by the regime of
the custodians.
On the prison officials' plight, see Statement of A. Bernard, Warden, Nevada State
Penitentiary, in Conn. State Prison, Monthly Record, March 1959, p. 25:
All I want is for people to tell me what they want done with prisoners. I'll
punish them. 'If they want them reformed, I'll try to reform them. If they want
them confined, I'll try to confine them.
The only thing is, people must realize that they can't have their cake and eat
it too. If you want a man rehabilitated, you can't concentrate on punishing him.
When a human being is punished he becomes resentful.
Our orthodox criminal program is a peculiar combination of punishment, re-
straint, and half-hearted attempts at rehabilitation. These forms are all in conflict
with each other. They generate friction. They impair efficiency.
See generally CONN. PRISON STUDY CoMM., FINAL REPORT-A UNIFIED SYsTEM OF
Co. RcrloN (1957). The President of the Board of the State Prison, which is responsible
for handling a majority of Connecticut's felon inmate population, reported: "When I told
inmates that we hope to 'rehabilitate you,' they laughed, knowing full well that nothing
was being done at the prison toward rehabilitation." Id. at 20; see Peizer, Lewis, &
Scollin, Correctional Rehabilitation as a Function of Interpersonal Relations, 46 J. ClIM.
L., C. & P.S. 632 (1956).
Another illustration of the kind of confusion frequently arising at a single point in the
process is to be found in court discussions of -punishment, treatment, and criminal respon-
sibility. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1957):
Two policies underly [sic] the distinction'in treatment between the responsible and
the non-responsible: (,1) It is both wrong and foolish to punish where there is no
blame- and where punishment cannot correct. (2) The Community's security may
be better protected by hospitalization . . . than by imprisonment.
(Emphasis added.) "Punish" and "punishment" are used in policy statement "(1)" to
suggest different underlying meanings or concepts. The word is first used as a symbol of
the vengeance or retribution function of the criminal law and then used as a symbol of
the rehabilitation function. Query: If "punishment," however defined, were an effective
rehabilitative device would the court find its use objectionable even if blameworthiness
could not be established? Is involuntary confinement for an indefinite period in a mental
hospital any less a deprivation, as the court seems to imply in policy statement "(2),"
than involuntary confinement for a limited period in a prison? See also Allen, Criminal
[Vol. 69: 543
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criminal process may likewise further some objectives while hindering others,
or, indeed, run counter to all, any meaningful appraisal of these decisions
should include an evaluation of their impact throughout the process on the
various objectives reflected in authorized sanctions and in the decisions of
other administrators of criminal justice.8
Under the rule of law, the criminal law has both a fair-warning function
for the public 9 and a power-restricting function -for officials.10 Both post- and
justice, Legal Valites and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L, C. & P.S. 226 (1959) ;
Lewis, The Humanitarian. Theory of Punishnent, 6 REs JUDIcATAE 224 (1953) ; PARSoNs,
THE SociaL SsmM 309-14 (1951).
8. Conflicts of purpose and function arise not only among the administrators of crim-
inal justice -within a single jurisdiction, but also between administrators in different juris-
dictions. See United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. Cal. 1955), in which
Federal Judge Tolin reduced a five-year sentence for a robbery of a California bank to
sixty days, because the District Attorney of Los Angeles County refused to remove a
California detainer, based on the same "offense," from the convicted offender. The de-
tainer meant that Candelaria, following his release from the federal prison system, might
be prosecuted by California for the same "offense" of which he was convicted and sen-
tenced in federal court. It also meant, under Federal Parole Board policy then, but no
longer in effect, that the offender could not be released on parole. Letter From James
V. Bennett, Director of Federal Bureau of Prisons, to Joseph Goldstein, March 12, 1958.
The court said:
When a Federal Judge, acquainted with the type of corrective treatment which
will be administrated to an offender, determines that five years of it is sufficient,
it changes the character of the penalty when local police or prosecutors can ad-
ministratively place a detainer which will alter the entire course of treatment of
the prisoner and keep him from receiving much of what the sentencing Judge in-
tended when the length of term was prescribed.
United States v. Candelaria, supra at 807. A subsequent conviction of Candelaria for rob-
bery under the California laws was reversed as a violation of the State's double jeopardy
statute. People v. Candelaria, 139 Cal. App. 2d 432, 294 P.2d 120 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
Candelaria was then tried for burglary and convicted a third time on the basis of the same
underlying set of facts. The conviction was affirmed. People v. Candelaria, 153 Cal. App.
2d 879, 315 P2d 386 (Dist. Ct App. 1957).
9. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), holding a New Jersey criminal
statute void for vagueness under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, in
which Mr. Justice Butler said:
No one may be required at the peril of life, liberty or property to speculate
as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the
State commands or forbids. The applicable rule is stated in Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 . . . "That the terms of a penal statute creating
a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it
what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties, is a well-recog-
nized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled
rules of law. And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its ap-
plication, violates the first essential of due process of law."
Id. at 453. But see Koa Gora v. Hawaii, 152 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S.
862 (1946) ("[T]he common law did not define those acts [comprising lascivious conduct
19601
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preverdict sanctions, therefore, may be imposed only in accord with authorized
procedures. No sanctions are to be inflicted other than those which have been
prospectively prescribed -by the constitution, legislation, or judicial decision
for which the defendant was convicted] with any more certainty than do the statutes to-
day. 'The sense of decency, propriety, and morality, which most people entertain' in the
community is still the test").
How effectively the criminal law is communicated to .the public, and thus actually
gives fair warning, is a subject about which little empirical data have been collected, and
one which deserves investigation. For judicial recognition of practical limitations on the
fair-warning function see MdfBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931), holding that
a "self-propelled vehicle" in a penal statute did not include an airplane, in which Mr.
Justice Holmes said: "Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the
text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should
be given to the world ...of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed."
Apparently, however, some offenders are very well informed, see, e.g., Parole File of
George Drew (convicted in Connecticut for sodomy) : "[At the time of arrest] found on
Drew was a handwritten table showing the penalties in each of the 48 states for the
crimes of Adultery, Fornication, Seduction and Sodomy." Donnelly, Goldstein & Schwartz,
Cases on Problems Arising in the Promulgation, Invocation, Administration and Enforce-
ment of a Law of Crimes, 2d tent. eL, Jan. 1959, ch. II, at 354 (mimeo on file in Yale
Law Library).
For cases considering the application of the "vice of vagueness" doctrine to a variety
of penal provisions, see, e.g., United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. .169 (1952) (a federal
statute); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.iS. 337 (1952) (an adminis-
trative regulation); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (in a contempt of
Congress case, a congressional resolution establishing a congressional committee).
Concerning these problems and common law crimes, see Commonwealth v. Mochan,
177 Pa. Super. 454, 110 A.2d 788 (1955) ; Regina v. Newland, [1954] 1 Q.B. 158 (C.A.);
Note, Common Law Cri iws in the United States, 47 COLUM. L. Rv. 1332 (1947).
See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Hart, The Aims of
the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 401., 440-41 (1958) and Proposed Puerto
Rico -Code of Correction pt. I, § 3 (Dession draft mimeo [undated]) :
Function. Recognition, communication and protection of the Commonwealth's
preferred form of public order comprise the function of this Code. The situations
within its purview are those deemed so destructive of such order as to concern
the Commonvealth as a whole. Its provisions define and are intended to give fair
warning of the kinds of conduct which will be regarded as precipitating such situa-
tions. The measures prescribed are shaped for the prevention and correction of such
situations. The Code is thus conceived as an instrument of the total policy of
Puerto Rico.
10. See, e.g., Logan x. People, 138 Colo. 304, 332 P.2d 897 (1958), holding that mak-
ing an appearance bond a condition of probation is invalid because, inter aia, forfeiture
of the bond on failure to appear would be an additional punishment and thus would en-
large the punitive power of thg court far beyond that contemplated "by the laws of this
state"; State v. Doughtie, 237 N.C. 368, 74 S.E2d 922 (1953), invalidating sentence of
banishment as "beyond the power of the court to inflict." See also In the Matter of the
Communication of the Grand Jury in the Case of Lloyd and Carpenter, 3 Pa. L.J. Rep.
55, 56-57 (Ct. Q. Sess. 1845) ("[W]hile the ,Commonwealth demands [from those charged
with the administration of criminal justice] the vigorous execution of her humane crim-
inal code, she seeks not its vindication, at the expense of the just rights of her citizens.") ;
People v. Snow, 340 111. 464, 173 N.E. 8 (1930) ("A criminal may have forfeited his
[Vol. 69:5$43
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for a particular crime or a particular kind of offender."' These concepts, of
course, do not preclude differential disposition, within the authorized limits, of
persons suspected or convicted of the same or similar offenses. In an ideal sys-
tem differential handling, individualized justice, would result, but only from an
equal application of officially approved criteria designed to implement officially
approved objectivesYl And finally a system which presumes innocence requires
right to liberty, but neither courts nor any other power have the right to deprive him of
it except in accordance with the law of the land.") ; ef. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). For discussions of the doctrine of nulla poena Sine lcgc and the concept of "or-
dered liberty," see generally HALL, G NERAL 'PRINCIPLES oF Ca~miNAL LAw ch. 2 (1947);
WHLIMs, ,CRnX1NAL LA-w-THE GENERAL PAnr §§ 128-35 (1953).
A single criminal procedure such as indictment, information, bill of particulars and
discovery, is designed to serve both a fair-warning and power-restricting function. See,
e.g., State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 327, 77 S.E.2d 917, 919 (1953) :
[ ]n indictment... to be good must allege lucidly and accurately all the essential
elements of the offense... charged. The purpose of such constitutional provisions
is: (1) such certainty in the statement of the accusation as will identify the offense
with which the accused is sought to be charged, (2) to protect the accused from
being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, (3) to enable the accused to pre-
pare for trial, and (4) to enable the court, on conviction or plea of nolo contendere
or guilty to pronounce sentence according to the rights of the case.
On prospectivity, see, e.g., State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 630, 107 P-2d 324, 329 (1940),
in which the New Mexico Supreme Court held movie bank nights a lottery, but at the
same time precluded conviction of the defendants because they acted in reliance on a for-
mer decision and "did only that which this court declared, even if erroneously, to be with-
in the law'
11. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 224 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1955) (habitual of-
fender) ; State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21 (1954) (youthful offenders).
12. !See State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A-2d 313, 315 (1958), Sommenting on
judge's discretion in ruling on pretrial motion for discovery of defendant's confession:
"In some areas an exercise of discretion must necessarily remain an intuitive response to
a set of facts. Here, however, some guiding criteria can be prescribed and hence should
be, to guard against arbitrariness and imequal treatment . . . ." In submitting the First
Interim Report, Conn. Prison Study Comm., Nov. 19, 1956, which proposed the establish-
ment of a board of judges to review the sentences of any aggrieved offender, Chairman
Patrick B. O'Sullivan wrote the Governor on D'cember 3, 1956:
The difficulty of obtaining uniformity of sentencing will be apparent to anyone
who gives even the most cursory thougit to the problem .... What may appeal
to one [judge] as a proper sentente will seem to another to be either inadequate
or oppressive .... The 'ptoblemis not hoto to aetieve uniiform sentences but how
to develop a uniforan set-of prindiples'for s~ntehtig and to iijsur& the application
- of:these -principles thrduliout the Slate.... .... ...
(Emphasis added.Y -
In State v. Young, Conn. L.J., Sept. 30, 1958. pp. 7-8. the Sentence Review Division
established in response to the Prison Study Committee proposal wrote:
To hold that the sentencing judge should ignore the facts of the particular
crime, the prior record of the defendant and the probability of rehabilitation of the
defendant is untenable. Young points out that there is considerable variation in
sentences imposed by judges of our Superior Court for the same offense. This may
1960]
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that preconviction sanctions be kept at a minimum consistent with assuring an
opportunity for the process to run its course.
1 3
A regularized system of review is a requisite for insuring substantial com-
pliance by the administrators of criminal justice with these rule-of-law prin-
ciples. Implicit in the word "review" and obviously essential to the operation
well be so. Were it not so, it would indicate that judges were ignoring the prin-
ciples of individual consideration which are essential in each case. A proper sen-
tence should fit the crime and the individual.
See also State v. Johnson, Conn. U.J., July 1, 1958, p. 19 (Sentence Rev. Div.); United
States v. Pendergast, 28 F. Supp. 601, 605 (W.D. Mo. 1939). In Burns v. United States,
287 U.S. 216 (1932), Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said, concerning the Federal Probation
Act:
It was designed to provide a period of grace in order to aid the rehabilitation
of the penitent offender . . . . It is necessary to individualize each case to give that
careful, humane and comprehensive consideration to the particular situation of each
offender which would be possible only in the exercise of a broad discretion.
Id. at 220. See also Logan v. People, 138 Colo. 321, 332 P.2d 897 (1958).
For officially approved criteria for determining the amount of bail, see FEv. R. Cniau.
P. 46(c) ; Stack v. Boyle, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1951) (concurring opinion of Jackson, J.) :
I do think there is a fair showing that these congressionally enacted standards
have not been correctly applied.
It is complained that the District Court fixed a uniform blanket bail chiefly by
consideration of the nature of the accusation and did not take into account the
difference in circumstance between different defendants .... Each defendant stands
before the bar of justice as an individual ...
13. "Booking," charging and arraigning, with all its concomitant inconveniences and
embarrassments, will have to be borne by many citizens who would otherwise have
been given an opportunity to make clear their innocence without being subjected
to such difficulties or stigma.
United States v. Bonnano (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1959), in N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1959, p. 38,
col. 2.
This practice [the police holding a suspect in detention before they are ready
to prefer charge] has one feature which may be of advantage to the detained per-
son; if innocent he has a good prospect of being released without any publicity or
stigma. It may be a real hardship to an innocent man to have to appear in open
court, even to be discharged as guiltless ....
Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure, Report, CMD. No. 3297, at 58 (1929).
The purpose of bail is to restrain as little as possible the liberty of the citizen
consistent with his retention until his guilt or innocence of the offense alleged
against him can be ascertained by due course of law.
Duncan v. Hodge, 46 Ala. 523, 526 (1871). Many police manuals contain exhortations
reflecting this view. The RicHmoND, VA., BUREAU OF POLICE Rut.Es & REGS. (1957), for
example, provides "Advice to Policemen .... Whenever you deem it necessary to make
an arrest, do it; but use no more force than is necessary to protect yourself and secure
your prisoner"; PORTLAND, dME., POLICE DEi'T RULES & REos. § 1124.04 (reprinted in
WIL oN, POLICE PLANNING 366-67 (2d ed. 1957)) provides:
All officers should know that the prisoner has certain rights guaranteed him by
the United States and Maine Constitutions . . . . He shall not be subject to more
[Vol. 69:543
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of any review procedure is the visibility of the decisions and conduct to be
scrutinized. Pretrial hearings on motions, the trial, appeal and the writ of
habeas corpus constitute a formal system for evaluating the actions of officials
invoking the criminal process. The public hearing, the record of proceedings,
and the publication of court opinions-all features of the formal system-
preserve and increase the visibility of official enforcement activity and facili-
tate and encourage the development of an informal system of appraisal. These
proceedings and documents are widely reported and subjected to analysis and
comment by legislative, professional, and other interested groups and individ-
uals.14
restraint than is necessary to hold or confine him .... He is assumed to be inno-
cent until pronounced guilty....
On presumption of innocence and entrapment, see Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369,372 (1958).
On public accusation, as a sanction, and the presumption of innocence, see People v.
Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 20, 171 N.E. 890, 891 (1930), quoting with approval the follow-
ing from Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 344 (1857):
The right of individual citizens to be secure from an open and public accusa-
tion of crime, and from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, before a
probable cause is established by the presentment and indictment of the grand jury,
in case of high offenses, is justly regarded as one of the securities to the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive public prosecutions, and as one of the an-
cient immunities and privileges of English liberty.
Concerning bail and the presumption of innocence, see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4
(1951) ("Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence,
secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning."). However, the guilt or
innocence of an appellant is not an issue on application for bail pending appeal. D'Aquino
v. United States, 180 F2d 271 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1950).
On denial of pretrial motions for discovery as undermining "our bedrock presumption
of innocence," see State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (.1953) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ; State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 142-44, 145 A2d 313, 318-19 (1958) (to deny pre-
trial discovery on "fear of perjury virtually postulates universal guilt"-in effect, over-
ruling Tune).
For an expression of dissatisfaction with the impact of the presumption of innocence
on the administration of criminal justice, see United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649
(S.D.N.Y. 1923) (L. Hand, J.) :
Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has
been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal
dream. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism .and the watery sentiment
that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime.
On the application of the presumption of innocence at trial, see Au.m , LExA Dumns
271, 283 (1931.) ; 9 WimcoRa, EvmENCE § 2511 (1940).
Query: To what extent should the presumption of innocence be manipulated to restrict
to a minimum the application of preconviction sanctions in the administration of the crim-
inal justice?
14. It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to evaluate how effectively rules
of evidence, for example, and present review opportunities control the behavior of police
invoking the criminal process. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 135 (1953).
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But police decisions not to invoke the criminal process, except when re-
flected in gross failures of service, are not visible to the community. Nor are
they likely to be visible to official state reviewing agencies, even those within
the police department. Failure to tag illegally parked cars is an example of
gross failure of service, open to public view and recognized for what it is.15
An officer's decision, however, not to investigate or report adequately a dis-
turbing event which he has reason to believe constitutes a violation of the
criminal law does not ordinarily carry with it consequences sufficiently visible
to make the community, the legislature, the prosecutor, or the courts aware
of a possible failure of service. The police officer, the suspect, the police de-
partment, and frequently even the victim, when directly concerned with a
decision not to invoke, unlike the same parties when responsible for or subject
to a decision to invoke, generally have neither the incentive nor the oppor-
tunity to obtain review of that decision or the police conduct associated with
An interesting example of the exposure of police activity to review and appraisal is the
vast number of cases and comments which have accompanied the development of the ex-
clusionary rule as a device to prevent or at least discourage unreasonable search and
seizures by police who seek to invoke the criminal process. High visibility and a system
of review, however, will not necessarily result in full compliance by officials with the
rules of law. See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), and the
cases and comments cited therein. In adopting the exclusionary rule, the court said:
If the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures are to
have significance they must be enforced, and if courts are to discharge their duty
to support the state and federal constitutions they must be willing to aid in their
enforcement. If those guarantees were being effectively enforced by other means
than excluding evidence obtained by their violation, a different problem would be
presented. . . .Experience has dentnstrated, however, that neither administrative,
criminal nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures.
... Moreover, even when it becomes generally known that the police conduct illegal
searches and seizures, public opinion is not aroused as it is in the case of other vio-
lations of constitutional rights .... People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 P. 435, 24
A.L.R. 1383, was decided over thirty years ago. Since then case after case has ap-
peared in our appellate reports describing unlawful searches and seizures against the
defendant on trial, and those cases undoubtedly reflect only a small fraction of the
violations of the constitutional provisions that have actually occurred. On the other
hand, reported cases involving civil actions against police officers are rare, and those
involving succesiful criminal prosecutions against officers are non-existent. In short,
the constitutional provisions are not being enforced.
Id. at 447-48; 282 P.2d at 913. (Emphasis added.)
But without visibility, the likelihood of compliance is greatly reduced, if not precluded.
Fof-an interesting symposium, v'hich highlights the need for research on actual police
practices see Coakley, Peterson, Inliau, Foote, Paulsen & Leibowitz, Symposiunt--Are
the Courts Ifandcuffing the Police?, 52 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 1 (1957).
15. 'See, e.g., Editorial, "No Parking" Means Nothing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1958,
p. 26, cols. 3-4; id., Nov. 20, 1958, p. 1, col. 8 (police action to "clean up the unwhole-
some parking abuses," and the ordering of necessary measures for "continuous and sus-
tained enforcement" of parking rules). See also id., March 3, 1959, p. 21, col. 6 (report
of Detroit police failure to issue the average daily number of tickets for motor vehicle
violations as a protest against integration of Negro and white patrolmen in squad cars).
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it. 6 Furthermore, official police records are usually too incomplete to permit
evaluations of nonenforcement decisions in the light of the purposes of the
criminal law'. Consequently, such decisions, unlike decisions to enforce, are
16. In addition to the descriptive material in text at note 84 infra, see, e.g., Irvine
v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137 (1953).
Nonenforcement programs may be made visible by defendants who claim that enforce-
ment against them deprived them of equal protection of the law. State v. Jourdain, 225
La. 1030, 74 So. 2d 203 (1954) (failure to give defendant "opportunity" to become an
informer) ; People v. Winters, 342 P.2d 538 (Cal. Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1959) (dismissal
by trial judge of complaint on ground of discriminatory enforcement of gambling laws
against Negroes reversed without prejudice to defendant's right to prove intentional or
deliberate discriminatory enforcement). See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1960, p. 14, cols. 2-3
(charges of discriminatory enforcement of gambling laws against Negro numbers opera-
tors).
17. Lack of any basic records of the squad's activities thwarts a penetrating view of
the services performed; but what is not available to this survey is by the same
token also denied to superior officers of the force. The plain fact is that no one,
not even the officers of the squad, has any means of reviewing that unit's conduct,
work, or abiding value, because the underlying and complex pattern of precinct
boundaries is controlling in such matters.
SmIrr, THE NEW YoRx POLICE SuRavy 20 (Institute of Public Administration 1952).
From the evidence adduced before the Grand Jury it finds:
(3) That police officers failed to make proper entries in their memorandum
books concerning the performance of their duties.
People v. Doe (Report of the Fourth December 1958 Grand Jury), N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess.,
N.Y. City, March 11, 1959.
See also ILLrxois DmSiox, ACLU, SEcaE'r DarrEroN By THE CHIcAGo PoucE 25
(1959) ; Parratt, How Effective Is a Police Departimentf, 199 ANNALS 153, 156-57 (1938);
Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L REv. 16, 26-27 (1957).
Reported cases on the discharge of patrolmen or conviction for neglect of duty because
required reports were not made are rare. See People v. Grawunder, 2 Misc. 2d 126, 151
N.Y.S.2d 137 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (police officer's failure to disclose information, as required
by police department regulation (Buffalo), is neglect of duty); Armbruster v. City of
Middletown, 74 Ohio App. 321, 58 N.E.2d 778 (1944).
On the need for adequate records as a basis for internal control see Iz.anNATio.AL
CITY MANAGERS Ass'x, MuNciCAP. PoLicE EADImiNsTRAiox c. 12 (4th ed. 1954) ; \Vm-
soN, PoLCE ADmINISTRATiON c. 13 (1950).
Even highly visible criminal activity by the police theoretically subject to the criminal
law as well as to departmental revimv sometimes is condoned. See, e.g., Sirru, Nmv
YoRK PoLIcE Suavay 9, 10, 17 (Institute of Police Administration 1952) describing the
department's disciplinary policy as
.... low in its standards,.., uncertain in'its application, and... unfirm in its
resolution to clear the force of undesirables . . . . Under such circumstances it is
not surprising that the number of men charged is moderate for all types of offenses,
because their commanders obviously cannot expect to be vigorously supported by
trial commissioners and hence will withhold their charges until intolerable circum-
stances force them to act ...
And violations, for example adultery, made visible in civil proceedings with concurrent
failure by the police to invoke the criminal process have apparently not prompted dis-
ciplinary action. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, comment at 204-05 (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1955).
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generally not subject to the control which would follow from administrative,
judicial, legislative, or community review and appraisal.' 8
-Confidential reports detailing the day-to-day decisions and activities of a
large municipal police force have been made available to the author by the
"Amrican Bar Foundation. These reports give limited visibility to a wide
variety of police decisions not to invoke the criminal process.' Three groups
of- such decisions will be described and analyzed. Each constitutes a police
"program" of nonenforcement either based on affirmative departmental policy
or condoned by default. All of the decisions, to the extent that the officers
'c6iicerned thought about them at all, represent well-intentioned, honest judg-
ments, which seem to reflect the police officer's conception of his job. None of
the decisions involve bribery or corruption, nor do they concern "obsolete,"
though unrepealed, criminal laws. Specifically, these programs involve police
decisions (1) not to enforce the narcotics laws against certain violators who
inform against other "more serious" violators; (2) not to enforce the felonious
assault laws against an assailant whose victim does not sign a complaint; and
(3) not to enforce gambling laws against persons engaged in the numbers
racket, but instead to harass them. Each of these decisions are made even
though the police "know" a crime has been committed, and even though
they may "know" who the offender is and may, in fact, have apprehended
him. But before describing and evaluating these nonenforcement programs, as
an agency of review might do, it is necessary to determine what discretion,
if any, the police, as invoking agents, have, and conceptually to locate the
police in relation to other principal decisionmakers in the criminal law process.
II
The police have a duty not to enforce the substantive law of crimes unless
invocation of the process can be achieved within bounds set by constitution,
statute, court decision, and possibly official pronouncements of the prosecu-
tor.20 Total enforcement, were it possible, is thus precluded, by generally
18. For a general discussion of the ineffectiveness of departmental and civil service
procedures as devices for establishing police policy and for holding police officers account-
able for their actions, see SMITH, PoLIcz SYSTEMs IN THE UNITED STATES 146-57, 204-32
(rev. ed. 1949); GocKE & STALLINGS, POLICE SERGEANTS MANUAL 110-12 (4th ed. 1955).
For a discussion of "superior" internal control procedures, see WILSON, POLICE ADMINis-
.TRAoN 58-79 (1950). See generally APPENDIX 'I, A Note on Holding the Police Account-
able for "Neglect of Duty," infra at 592; notes 26-27 infra.
- 19. The low visibility of these decisions must in a sense be preserved because of the
author's obligation not to identify informants or the police deipartment involved by specific
citations to American Bar Foundation, Pilot Project Report-The Survey of the Admin-
istration of Criminal Justice (1957), or to supporting field reports. To effectuate the
Foundation's policy of maintaining the anonymity of the police department and its officers,
no citations to statutes, case law, or legislative hearings of the state or local jurisdiction,
as well as congressional hearings, will be given when such citations would compromise
confidentiality.
20. The phrase "official pronouncements of the prosecutor" is intended to exclude
prosecutor orders or suggestions which are not a matter of record. Note, however, that
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applicable due-process restrictions on such police procedures as arrest, search,
seizure, and interrogation.2 1 Total enforccmcnt is further precluded by such
the police may be, and probably are, responsive to the prosecutor's concept of law enforce-
ment, a concept, developing out of and communicated as part of an intimate working
relationship, which is seldom reduced, so far as orders not to enforce are concerned, to
documents of record. State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 16S-69, 96 A.2d 63 (1953). For a
rare exception, see State ex rel. Wear v. Francis, 95 Mo. 44, 8 S.W. 1 (1888), authoriz-
ing the issuance of a writ vacating a prosecutor's order to the chief of police not to enforce
the law against Sunday sales of wine and beer.
The type of official pronouncement contemplated may be represented by Memorandum
From Attorney General William P. Rogers to United States Attorneys, reprinted in
N.Y. Times, April 6, 1959, p. 19, col. 2:
[N]o Federal case should be tried when there has already been a state prosecution
for substantially the same act or acts without the United States Attorney first
submitting a recommendation to the appropriate Assistant Attorney General in
the department. No such recommendation should be approved by the Assistant
Attorney General ... without having it first brought to my attention.
Compare the Candelaria cases, note 8 supra. See also Formal Opinion of the Attorney
General No. 14, NJ., Sept. 29, 1958, advising the state police that issuance of warning
citations for motor vehicle violations is "within their discretionary authority to promote
the public safety on the highways:'
If the police are to be held accountable for decisions not to enforce based on prosecutor
policy, they ought to be entitled to insist that prosecutors place all nonenforcement orders
on record.
To evaluate the performance of a police organization without endeavoring to
determine how -it is influenced by the concurrent and sometimes conflicting activities
of the prosecutor is to produce a picture which is out of focus and which can lead
to more misunderstanding than if no study were attempted at all.
Olney, What the American Bar Foundation's Survey of Cri inal Justiec Means to Lat
Enforcement, THE POLICE YAMBOOK 85, 90 (1956). On prosecutor discretion, see note 28
infra.
21. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 106 (1945); Williams v. United
States, 341 U.S. 97, 101 (1951); Pool v. United States, 260 F2d 57, 58-63 (9th Cir.
1958), affirming conviction and sentence of the Chief of Police of North Las Vegas,
Nevada, for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958), which provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, ... or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant
of any State ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States ...shall be ...
imprisoned not more than one year ....
On "the abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions," see Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1958), in which the Court stated:
[This abhorrence] also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey
the law while -enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much
endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals a.
from the actual criminals themselves. Accordingly, the actions of police in obtaining
confessions have come under scrutiny in a long series of cases. Those cases suggest
that in recent years law enforcement officials have become increasingly aare
of the burden which they share, along with our courts, in protecting fundamental
rights of our citizenry, including that portion of our citizenry suspected of crime.
See generally IETEERATIONAL CITY MfANAGm-S' Ass'K, MuNIcIPA PoLIc AIDhnIsTRATtO.-:
493, 495 (4th ed. 1954); Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search-A
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specific procedural restrictions as prohibitions on invoking an adultery statute
unless the spouse of one of the parties complains,2 2 or an unlawful-possession-
of-firearms statute if the offender surrenders his dangerous weapons during
a statutory period of amnesty.23 Such restrictions of general and specific
application mark the bounds, often ambiguously,24 of an area of full enforce-
ment in which the police are not only authorized but expected to enforce fully
the law of crimes.25 An area of no enforcement lies, therefore, between the
Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. Rzv. 565 (1955); Allen, Due Process and
State Criminal Procedures: Andther Look, 48 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 16 (1953); Pound, Legal
Interrogatim of Peronsr Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1014 (1934).
Such restrictions are reflected in considerable detail in police manuals. See, e.g., with
regard to confessions, Drgoir, MICH., Rzv. PocaCE MANUAL ch. 10, § 81 (1958) which
provides:
Officers shall not use duress or mistreat an accused person in any way when en-
deavoring to obtain a confession. A confession made by a person who has not
been given his rights can always be attacked by the accused in court and may
lead to the acquittal of a guilty person.
See also Kennedy, Keynote Address, THE POLICE YRARBOOK 8 (1957):
It is the primary duty of the police not only to cope with crime but to cope with
it properly. The role of the police in a democratic society is to maintain the
delicate balance between the liberty of the individual on one hand, and the demands
of society for protection against crime on the other.
To uphold such liberty the policeman must always be objective in the perform-
ance of his duties. He must be constantly mindful of the civil rights of all of the
people. He should show neither fear nor favor in the discharge of his duties.
22. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, comment (10) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) ; see Perry
v. State, 84 Okla. Crim. 211, 181 P2d 280 (1947) (on power of prosecutor to seek
dismissal of adultery proceeding despite objection of offended spouse). Compare Taylor
v. State, 29 Okla. Crim. 160, 232 Pac. 963 (1925), with State v. Astin, 106 Wash. 336,
180 Pac. 394 (1919) (conflicting views on right of offended spouse to discontinue adultery
prosecution which -he or she instituted). The Model Penal Code also provides:
No prosecution for theft may be maintained against a spouse or member of the
household.. . unless the victim or someone acting on his behalf complains to public
authority within six months after learning of the offense ....
MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.13(4) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
23. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1899' (4) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be prosecuted for...
the illegal possession of any pistol,... [or any other] dangerous weapon . . . if he
surrenders such weapon to ... [the police] ... between the first and thirtieth days
of June, nineteen hundred and fifty-nine.
Statutes Of limitations may be either specific or general in application. See Note, 102
U. PA. L. Rzv. 630 (1954).
24. See PARKER, POLICE 103 (1951), where Los Angeles Police Chief Parker, com-
menting on due process boundaries are set by the courts, notes: ". . . the rules governing
the actions of the police are indistinct, ill-defined, vague and uncertain ... ." See also note
29 infra.
25. The police, in our legal tradition, are essentially ministerial officers. To them
have been delegated relatively few grants of discretionary power which require
interpretation of meaning before application. Thus a simple and logical hypothesis
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perimeter of total enforcement and the outer limits of fidl emforcement. In
this no enforcement area, the police have no authority to invoke the criminal
process.
Within the area of fidl enforcement, the police have not been delegated dis-
cretion not to invoke the criminal process. On the contrary, those state statutes
providing for municipal police departments which define the responsibility of
police provide:
It shall be the duty of the police.., under the direction of the mayor
and chief of police and in conformity with the ordinances of the city, and
the laws of the state,... to pursue and arrest any persons fleeing from
justice ... to apprehend any and all persons in the act of committing any
offense against the laws of the state ... and to take the offender forth-
with before the proper court or magistrate, to be dealt with for the of-
fense; to make complaints to the proper officers and magistrates of any
person known or believed by them to be guilty of the violation of the
ordinances of the city or the penal laws of the state; and at all times
diligently and faithfully to enforce all such laws .... 21,
can be constructed: police are ministerial officials charged vith the enforcement
of laws; success in police administration is directly related to completeness and
perfection in the performance of this task.
Parratt, How Effective Is a Police Department?, 199 ANNALS 153 (1938).
26. MIcn. STAT. ANN. § 5.1752 (1949); accord, ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 54, § 5(4)
(1941); ALASKA Coin'. LAws ANN. §§ 40-12-8 to -10 (curn. supp. 1958) (duties of
territorial police); ARa. STAT. ANN. § 19-1705 (1956); COLO. Rxv. STA'. ANN. § 139-
75-5 (1954) ; HAWAII REV. LAws § 31-5 (1955) (duties of high sheriff as head of terri-
torial police); ILL. R v. STAT., ch. 38, § 655 (1957) ; IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-6107, 486110
(1950) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 748.4 (1950); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 15, § 2 (1954)
(state police) ; MAss. LAws ANN. ch. 41, § 98 (1952) ; Mo. STAT. ANN. § 74.203 (1952)
(duties of chief of police); Na. REV. STAT. § 29-401 (1948) ; OHIO R'v. CODE ANN. §
737.11 (Page 1954); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2129 (1955) ; UTAH CODE An:%. § 10-6-6
(1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 15-557 (1956) ; XV. VA. CODE ANN. § 509 (1955) ; Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 62.09(13) (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-12 (1959). The full eniforcement
mandate is reinforced in such states by local police manuals. E.g., BosTON, 1Ass., Pouice
DEP'T RULFs & REGs. foreword, rules 10, § 2; 24 § 1; 35 § 5(d) (1950); Cnmcnm-NA,
OHio, POLICE DIvIsiOx MANUAL §§ 00.673(h), 01.09 (1959) ; DuRnOrr, IMica., REv. PoLCEc
MANUAL ci. 1 § 9, ch. 2 § 1, ch. 3 § 142 (1958); M LWAUKEE, Vxs., PoLcE DEeT RULES
& REGs. introduction at vii, rules 1, §3; 5, §2; 6, §2; 7, §§4, 8,49; 11, § 1; 14, § 1; 28, §§3,
24 (1932) ; NASHVILLE, TENN., PoLxIC DEVr RULES & REGs. 9; §§ 14, 33 (1955) ; NEw
BmFOR, MASS., PoLIcE DEE'T RULES & RunS. rules 1; 4, § 2; 14, § 11; 15, § 3 (1957);
SALT LAKE Crry, UTAH, POLICE MANUAL foreword at 3; cI. III, §§ 3, 5, 7; ch. IV, §§ 3, 9;
ch. VI, § 1 (1951) ; Sioux Cry, IowA, POLICE DEV'T MANUAL pp. 20, § 1; 24, § 2; 26, § 2;
29, § 2; 31, § 2; 42, § 1. (1956) ; WHEuxNG, W. VA., POLIcE DEI'T RULES & REns. §§ 3, 5
[undated].
An apparent exception is a New Mexico statute which provides that police must
investigate all violations of the criminal laws which are called to their attention, but they
appear to have a limited discretion as to enforcement. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-1-1 (1954)
provides:
It is hereby declared to be the duty of every sheriff, . .. and every other peace
officer to investigate all violations of the criminal laws of the state of New
Mexico which are called to the attention of any such officer or of which he is
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Even in jurisdictions without such a specific statutory definition, declarations
of the full enforcement mandate generally appear in municipal charters, ordi-
nances or police manuals. Police manuals, for example, commonly provide, in
sections detailing the duties at each level of the police hierarchy, that the
captain, superintendent, lieutenant, or patrolman shall be responsible, so far
as is in his power, for the prevention and detection of crime and the enforce-
ment of all criminal laws and ordinances.2 7 Illustrative of the spirit and policy
aware, and it is also declared the duty of every such officer to diligently file a
complaint or information, if the circunistances are such as to indicate to a reason-
ably prudent person that such action should be taken, and it Is also declared his
duty to cooperate with and assist the attorney general, district attorney, or other
prosecutor, if any, in all reasonable ways. Failure to perform his duty in any
material way shall subject such officer so failing to removal from office and
payment of all costs of prosecution.
(Emphasis added.)
Other New Mexico statutes expressly provide in enumerated areas for rigorous
police enforcement. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-2-22 (duty to enforce game laws),
40-18-6 (duty to enforce forest fire laws), 39-1-4 (duty to arrest and detain escaped
prisoners), 39-1-2 (duty to enforce livestock laws), 40-12-11 (duty to suppress riots)
(1954).
Statutes of other jurisdictions authorize the municipality to define the responsibilities
of the police. Typical of these enabling statutes is Miss. CODE ANN. § 3374-145 (1957),
which provides: "The governing authorities of municipalities shall have the power
and authority to employ, regulate and support a sufficient police force or night marshals
to define the duties thereof, and to furnish and supply all suitable and necessary equip-
ment therefore." For municipal ordinances and charters, see note 27 infra.
27. E.g., ATLANTA, GA., POLICE DEP'T RULEs & REGs. rules 23 (Police Chief), 44
(Super. of Detectives), 282 (Super. Traffic Div.), 297 (Traffic Capt.), 332 (Traffic Lt.),
372 (Traffic Patrolman), 400 (Super. Uniform Div.), 412 (Field Capt. Uniform Div.),
479 (Patrolman Uniform Div.) (1958); BERKELEY, CALIF., POLICE DEP'T REGS. intro-
duction (Law Enforcement Code of Ethics), §§ 9.05 (functions of police dep't), 401 (all
officers), 404 (responsibilities of police dep't), 408(b) (Special Investigations Div.)
(1956); CHARLOTTE, N.C., POLICE D8,T RuLs & REGS. rules 11-2, 111-1, IV-2, V-22,
VIII, §§ 1-26, -36 (1948); MiAmi, FLA., PoLIC: MANUAL rules 2, § 4 (Commanding
Officer); 3, § 2 (Chief of Police); 3, § 8 (Police chief promptly to investigate all
reports of violation of law and follow with proper action); 5, § 4 (Inspectors) ; 10, § 1
(Policeman); 11, §§ 2, 6, 10 (Chief of Detectives) ; 15, § 5 (Detective) ; 26, § 1 (all
members) (1956); NEv HAvEN, CONN., POLICE SERv. DEP'T MANUAL introduction; rules
1, § 1 (function of police dep't) ; 2, § 7 (Police Precinct) ; 2, § 15 (Div. of Traffic) ; 4,
§ 2 (Ass't Chief) ; 6, § 4 (Cap't) ; 7, § 1 (Traffic Div. Commander) ; 13, § 5 (Detec-
tives) ; 14, § 1 (Patrolmen) ; 25, § 4 (License Div. Chief) (1953); Nmv ORLEANS, LA.,
DIEP'T POLICE RULES art. 53 (all members) (1957); NEw YoaK CIY, N.Y., POLICE
DEP'T RULES & PROCEDURES ch. 1, §§ 1.0 (duties of dep't), 12.0 (Chief Inspector), 14.2
(commanding officers), 31.3 (Burglary Squads), 31.4 (Youth Squads), 31.6 (Riverfront
Squads), 42.0 (Narcotics Bureau), 45.0 (Traffic Div.), 48.0 (Motorcycle Div.), 58.0 (Avia-
tion Bureau), 63.0 (Juvenile Aid Bureau), ch. 8, § 1.0 (gambling laws) (1956) ; OAKLAND,
CAL., POLICE DEI"T MANUAL §§ 305.4 (Cap't of Inspectors), 354.4 (Division Commander)
401, 407 (all members), 408 (delegation of responsibility does not relieve all members
from general responsibility of enforcing all laws) (1955); ,PHoNIX, ARIz., POLICE MAN-
UAL §§ 200.2 (Chief), 300.3 (Division of Patrol), 1202.14 (Lieutenant, Division of Patrol),
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of full enforcement is this protestation from the introduction to the Rules and
Regulations of the Atlanta, Georgia, Police Department:
Enforcement of all Criminal Laws and City Ordinances, is my obligation.
There are no specialties under the Law. My eyes must be open to traffic
problems and disorders, though I move on other assignments, to slinking
vice in back streets and dives though I have 'been directed elsewhere, to
the suspicious appearance of evil wherever it is encountered .... I must
tbe impartial because the Law surrounds, protects and applies to all alike,
rich and poor, low and high, black and white ....
Minimally, then, full enforcement, so far as the police are concerned, means
(1) the investigation of every disturbing event which is reported to or ob-
served by them and which they have reason to suspect may be a violation of
the criminal law; (2) following a determination that some crime has been
committed, an effort to discover its perpetrators; and (3) the presentation of
1204.1 (Patrolman) (1953) ; PaovlmEcE, RJ., POLICE DmT RuLzs & Rrcs. rules II, § 1
(Chief) ; V, § 1 (Director of Traffic) ; VII, § 13 (Capt.) ; IX, § 1 (Patrolmen) (1942) ;
SAN FRAcIsco, CAL., POLICE DE'T RU.s & RExs. §§ 37 (Supervising Cap't), 60 (Chief
Inspector), 106 (Director, Bureau of Special Services), 141 (Capt.), 171 (L), 203, 212-
14 (Patrolmen), 432, 511 (all members) (1951) ; SEAxrrE, VAsn., PoLuc DE"T RULES
& Rw.s. §§ 1.42 (Chidef), 4.1.1 (all members) (1958) ; WAsHiNGToN, D.C., MrLOIouovTA1.
POLICE D 'VT -MANUAL acts §§ 4-119 (Bd. Comm'rs), 4-136 (all police) (1954).
The introductions to some police manuals contain a declaration that departmental rules
and regulations do not cover every situation faced by a policeman so that in some instances
the individual must exercise discretion. E.g., MiAm, FLA., PoLICE MANUAL (1956);
NEW HAvEN, CONx., PoLICE S-Rv. D&"T MANUAL 4 (1953); PHOENix, AmZ., POLICE
MANUAL (1953); SALT LAix Crr, UTAH, PoLIcE MAxuAL 3 (1951); Sioux Crry,
IowA, POLICE DEe'T MANUAL 4 (1956); WHEELING, W. VA., PoLIcE DEP'T RUI.Es &
REGs. 3 [undated].
In addition, some police manuals provide that departmental members have discretion
to warn violators for "slight infractions of the law." E.g., MfILWAUEE, Wis., POLICE
DEP'T RULES & RuFs. rules 14, § 60 (infraction of traffic regulations); 29, § 31 (a police
officer should bear in mind that frequently a polite warning to persons guilty of minor
offenses [undefined] will be sufficient and arrest in such cases should not be made unless
the violations are willful and repeated") (1932) ; POVmCE, R.I., POLICE DE' RULEs
& REGs. rule XI, § 35 (persons found peddling without a license) (1942).
For ordinances and charters providing for full enforcement, see, e.g., CoxcoR, N.H.,
ADminIsTRATivE CODE § 13(b) (1950) ; DALLAS, Tax., Cmr CODE tit. xxx, art. 107-4 (373)
(92) (1941) ; HousTox, Tax., Crry CODE ch. 35, art. I, §§ 1636, 1639(b), 1649, 1650 (1942) ;
NE .ARI, NJ., Ray. ORDINANCES § 2.132 (Cum. Supp. 1958) ; PoNCA CITY, OLA., CoDE §
133-34 (1943); PORTLAND, ORE., ADsNisTarvE CODE § 3-403 (1942); READING, PA.,
DIGEST ch. 3, § 8571, f 5(b) (1939); ST. PAuL, MINN., CIr CHAimr ch. XVIII, § 361
(1935) ; VALLEY Crry, N.D., REV. ORnNANCES § 4-104 (1940). For an ordinance silent on
state-law enforcement obligations, see OKIOA omA Crry, OKLA., Garr. OnailAxcEs § 16-8
(1936) (policemen "are authorized and required to arrest all persons who may he detected
violating any ordinance of the city and shall have and exercise such other and further
powers and perform such other and further duties as the protection of life and property
and preservation of peace and good order may require"). For a model ordinance which
incorporates the full-enforcement mandate, see I'ATHnEws, DRAnTING MUNICIPAL Oa-
DiNANcEs 132 (1956).
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all information collected by them to the prosecutor for -his determination of
the appropriateness of further invoking the criminal process.
28
Full enforcement, however, is not a realistic expectation. In addition to
ambiguities in the definitions of both substantive offenses and due-process
boundaries,29 countless limitations and pressures preclude the possibility of the
28. It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the extent to which the prosecutor
should have discretion not to invoke the criminal processes, and to determine what pro-
cedures should be established for making visible and reviewing the exercise of such dis-
cretion. On such prosecutor discretion and differing views on the limits of judicial control,
see Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Ky. 1947), reeld on other grounds, 166 F2d
844 (6th Cir. 1948), Note, 57 YALE L.J. 125 (1947) ; United States v. Brokaw, 60 F.
Supp. 100 (S.D. Ill. 1945) ; State v. Wallach, 353 Mo. 312, 322-24, 182 S.W.2d 313, 318-19
(1944) ; State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63 (1953) ; Leone v. Fanelli, 194 Misc. 826,
87 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Sup. Ct. 1949); State v. Hicks, 213 Ore. 619, 325 P.2d 794 (1958)
Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prdsecutors' Discretion, 13 LAW & Co'rx1.
PROB. 64, (1948) ; Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057 (1955). On the policy of denying prosecutor
power to delegate his discretionary authority, see McGarrah v. State, 10 Okla. Crim. 21,
23, 133 Pac. 260, 262 (1913).
On the prosecutor's obligation to pursue prosecution once having elected to prosecute,
compare Galbraith v. Lachey, 340 P2d 497, 502 (Okla. 1959), vith People ex rel. Elliot
v. Covelli, 415 Ill. 79, 112 N.E.2d 156 (1953). See also note 20 supra; Brief for Appellee,
p. 3, Petite v. United States, 28 U.S.L. WEEK 3244 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1960) (Solicitor General
on motion, granted by the Court, to vacate judgment and dismiss indictment):
. . . the Department of Justice has responsibility for the control of Government
litigation that is not confined to avoidance of legal error but extends to the formu-
lation of enlightened and prosecutional policies.
For police views of their enforcement function in relation to the function of the
prosecutor, see, e.g., Police Academy, Oakland, Calif., Police Dep't, Instructors' Material
Vol. 6, Bull. No. 35, Aug. 26, 1957, p. 8 (mimeo) ("we should . . . remember that it's
our job to turn in the evidence and it's the Prosecuting Attorney's job to determine
when a complaint will be issued") ; Statement of Chief F.B.I. Agent for Chicago, Illinois,
following his determination that a Miss Hart had falsely alleged that she had been kid-
napped: "Asked whether the girl had committed a crime if her story was a hoax, Mr.
Auerbach [the agent] said this was a problem for the United States Attorney, Lying
to an F.B.I. agent under oath is a federal offense." N.Y. Times, July 25, 1959, p. 37,
col. 4. "Mr. Auerbach said he had presented details of the situation to the United
States Attorney's office. Mitchell S. Rieger, Chief Assistant to the United States Attorney
in Chicago, said he had declined to authorize Miss Hart's prosecution in view of her
medical history and her current physical and mental condition." Id., July 26, 1959, p. 41,
col. 3.
For a discussion of prosecutor discretion raising serious problems of separation of
powers, see Statement of then Attorney General Jackson on his department's policy of
not enforcing the criminal libel laws in Hearings on the Ndmination of Robert H. Jackson
To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Before the Senate Coinmittee on the
Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 67-69 (1941). For an assertion of presidential dis-
cretion not to enforce the criminal law, see 8 TuE WrrirNus oF THOMAS JEFFEtsoN
308-11 (Ford ed. 1897).
29. Ambiguities in substantive definition, assuming no procedural ambiguities, may
cause events actually within the full enforcement area to appear to be beyond the boundary
of total enforcement. Ambiguities in procedural limitations, assuming no substantive
ambiguities, may cause events actually within the full enforcement area to appear to be
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police seeking or achieving fidl enforcement. Limitations of time, personnel,
and investigative devices-all in part but not entirely functions of budget "-
force the development, by plan or default, of priorities of enforcement. 3 ' Even
if there were "enough police"3 2 adequately equipped and trained, pressures
from within and without the department,3 3 which is after all a human insti-
tution, may force the police to invoke the criminal process selectively. By de-
cisions not to invoke within the area of full enforccent, the police largely
within the nto enforcement area between total and full enforcement. See diagram at 563
infra, in which these ambiguities are indicated by the wavy boundary lines dividing enforce-
ment areas.
30. See, e.g., Reiner v. Mayor & Council, 123 N.J.L. 563, 10 A.2d 160 (Sup. Ct. 1941)
(upholding ordinance abolishing the police department apparently for reasons of econ-
omy) ; Message From the Mayor of New York City to the Board of Estimate md the
City Council, Submitted With Executive Budget 1959-1960, reported in N.Y. Times.
April 2, 1959, p. 22, col. 7.
31. There are too few police to detect and investigate all crimes and to search out and
apprehend all suspects.
It is difficult for persons confronted with an impossible workload to think in term
of what should be done in each case to produce a completed job of good quality.
Their first thought is of how to cope with the impossible task .... This is the
situation as it exists today. The investigator is no longer concerned with seeing
that each case is processed to completion but is faced with deciding which cases.
will get the benefit of his situation.
Los ANGELES, CAL., POLICE DEP'T, SuRavx oF POLICE OFFICER P.PSONNEL RQuiEmE. Ts
22 (1958); see Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. LJ. 133, 149
(1953); VoI.umm, THE POLICE AND MODERN Socmwr 84 (1936). See also Stnit,
POLICE SYsTEsS IN THE Urran SArES 19-21 (rev. ed. 1949); Jackson, The Federal
Prosecutor, 24 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 18, 19 (1940) ; SMITH, NEw ORLEANs PoLIcE SL-WEV
8 (1946); SMITH & TimNED XA, THE BALTIMORE Pouca SuRvEY 1, 13, 16, 149-50
(1941) ; N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1956, p. 1, col. 1 (report of police Commissioner Kennedy) ;
Editorial, &fore Police, Less Crime, id., Feb. 15, 1956, p. 30, col. 2; Kennedy, Keynote
Address, THE POLICE YFxAUnooK 8, 10, 11 (1957); Nichols, Today's Challenges to Late
Enforcement, id. at 94-95; Swanson, Police and Children, The Police Chief, June 1958,
p. 18.
32. No satisfactory formula has yet been designed to determine the number of police
necessary to provide an "optimum" service. For a significant attempt to design such a
formula and a realistic statement of the difficulties involved, see Los ANGELES, CAI-
PoutcF Dsa'T, Suamv~ OF POLICE PERSONNEL REQuIREmENTs (1958); Parker, "How
Much Is Enough," Address Before the Annual Conference of The International Asso-
ciation of Chiefs of Police, Oct. 27, 1958. See also Walton, "Sclective Distribution" of
Police Patrol Fdrce, 49 J. CRan. L., C. & P.S. 165 (1958); WiL oN, POLICE PLAtNIN
46, 98, 115-116 (2d ed. 1957). For statistics on the number of police per 1000 persons
for all United States cities of over 10,000 population, see INTERNATIONAL CITr MANAGE LS
Ass'x, THE MUNICIPAL YEAnoox 400-16 (1957). For other complications in defining
"workload," see text following note 90 in!ra.
33. On "system-maintenance" pressures operating within or on the department, see
notes 65 & 67 infra and accompanying text. For a reflection of external pressures, see
PORTLAND, ME., POLICE DE]'T RuLEs & RESs. § 2040.11, reprinted in WILSON, POLILE
PLANNING 405 (2d ed. 1957):
He [the Intelligence Officer] shall guard himself against being forced into ill-
advised action against minor non-commercial violators that may result in arousing
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determine the outer limits of actual enforcement throughout the criminal proc-
ess. This relationship of the police to the total administration of criminal jus-
tice can be seen in the diagram opposite this page. They may reinforce, or they
may undermine, the legislature's objectives in designating certain conduct
"criminal" and in authorizing the imposition of certain sanctions following
conviction. A police decision to ignore a felonious assault "because the victim
will not sign a complaint," usually precludes the prosecutor or grand jury from
deciding whether to accuse, judge or jury from determining guilt or innocence,
judge from imposing the most "appropriate" sentence, probation or correc-
tional authorities from instituting the most "appropriate" restraint and reha-
bilitation programs, and finally parole or pardon authorities from determining
the offender's readiness for release to the community. This example is drawn
from one of the three programs of nonenforcement about to 'be discussed.
III.
Trading enforcement against a narcotics suspect for information about an-
other narcotics offense or offender may involve two types of police decisions
not to invoke fully the criminal process.3 4 First, there may be a decision to
ask for the dismissal or reduction of the charge for which the informant is
held; second, there may be a decision to overlook future violations while the
suspect serves as an informer. The second type is an example of a relatively
pure police decision not to invoke the criminal process while the first requires,
public indignation; raids on church buildings, homes, and privately occupied hotel
rooms not used for commercial purposes are occasionally examples.
See also GLUECK, FINAL REPORT OF THE N.Y. RESEARCH PROJECT FOR TE SruDY AND
TREATMENT OF PERSONS CONVICTED OF CRIMES INVOLVING SEXUAL AiiERRATIONS 3-4
(1956):
One . . .variable [explaining in part differences in percentage of "sex offenders"
in state prison populations] is the difference in enforcement of various laws in
different jurisdictions. Police activity varies from community to community, and
within the same community, depending on the number of men available for patrol
duty, the amount of immediate public pressure to do something about sexual
offenses, and the individual variable of the enforcement officer's own attitudeZ
toward sexual behavior of all types. The variation in mores within a culture,
which may be very rapid in periods of social tension, as have prevailed in this
country for the past fifteen years, can produce abrupt shifts in attitude about
sexual behavior, so that behavior that may be legally wrong becomes socially
acceptable.
On the need to take into account pressure from the prosecutor's office, see note 20 supra,
and text following note 34 infra.
34. For the view that "to 'trade' information for overlooking minor offenses" is
within the ambit of police discretion as a law enforcement device, see KENNEY, A GVmIr
FOR POLICE PLANNING: NAcoTIcs OPERATIONS 10 (1954) (" 'trading' is a law enforce-
ment practice that may not be accepted by persons not acquainted with police practices
and the extremely complex problem of law enforcement"); PORTLAND, ME, POLICE
DEP'T RULES & REGS. § 1123.08, reprinted in WILsON, POLICE PLANNING 365 (2d ed,
1957).
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at a minimum, tacit approval by prosecutor or judge. But examination of
only the pure types of decisions would oversimplify the problem. They fail to
illustrate the extent to which police nonenforcement decisions may permeate the
process as well as influence, and be influenced by, prosecutor and court action
in settings which fail to prompt appraisal of such decisions in light of the pur-
poses of the criminal law. Both types of decisions, pure and conglomerate, are
nonetheless primarily police decisions. They are distinguishable from a prose-
cutor's or court's decision to trade information for enforcement under an im-
munity statute,3 5 and from such parliamentary decisions as the now-repealed
seventeenth and eighteenth century English statutes which gave a convicted
offender who secured the conviction of his accomplice an absolute right to
pardon. 6 Such prosecutor and parliamentary decisions to trade information
for enforcement, unlike the police decisions to be described, have not only
been authorized by a legislative body, but have also been made sufficiently
visible to permit review37
In the municipality studied, regular uniformed officers, with general law
enforcement duties on precinct assignments, and a special narcotics squad of
detectives, with citywide jurisdiction, are responsible for enforcement of the
state narcotics laws. The existence of the special squad acts as a pressure on
the uniformed officer to be the first to discover any sale, possession, or use
of narcotics in his precinct. Careful preparation of a case for prosecution may
thus become secondary to this objective. Indeed, approximately eighty per cent
of -those apprehended for narcotics violations during one year were discharged.
In the opinion of the special squad, which processes each arrested narcotics
suspect, either the search was illegal or the evidence obtained inadequate.A
The precinct officer's lack of interest in carefully developing a narcotics case
for prosecution often amounts in effect to a police decision not to enforce but
rather to harass.3 9
35. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1958); The Model State Witness Immunity Act,
reprinted, with commentary, in 2 ADA, ORGANIZED CRIMtE AND LAw ENVORCEMtENT 157-
86 (1953). See also Nicosia, Enforceability of Prosecutors' Agreement Not To Prosecute,
24 J. Clm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 600, 601-02 (1934) (three methods of awarding immunity).
36. See RADIZINOWICZ, A HISTORy OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 33-56 (1956).
37. See note 48 infra and accompanying text.
38. Included in the total of arrests are those made by members of the special squad.
Figures for another year in the same period presented by the Chief of the Narcotics
Squad in congressional hearings indicate that squad members were responsible for approx-
imately one-third of the arrests. That year approximately half of the arrestees were
discharged.
The number of releases is particularly significant since the exclusionary rule in this
jurisdiction does not apply to narcotics illegally obtained outside of a dwelling house.
39. For a discussion of harassment as a form of police decision not to invoke the
criminal process see text accompanying notes 82-93 infra.
Another pure-form decision not to invoke the law against unlawful sales may result
from a police decision that it is more important to preserve the anonymity of the in-
formant than to proceed against a known offender. See, e.g., People v. McMurray, 340
P.2d 335, 337, 339 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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But we are concerned here primarily with the decisions of the narcotics
squad, which, like the Federal Narcotics Bureau, has established a policy of
concentrating enforcement efforts against the "big supplier."4 0 The chief of
the squad claimed that informers must be utilized to implement that policy,
and that in order to get informants it is necessary to trade "little ones for
big ones." Informers are used to arrange and make purchases of narcotics,
to elicit information from suspects, including persons in custody, and to recruit
additional informants.
Following arrest, a suspect will generally offer to serve as an informer to
"do himself some good." If an arrestee fails to initiate such negotiations, the
interrogating officer will suggest that something may be gained by disclosing
sources of supply and by serving as an informer. A high mandatory minimum
sentence for selling, a high maximum sentence for possesion, and, where users
are involved, a strong desire on their part to avoid the agonies of withdrawal,
combine to place the police in an excellent bargaining position to recruit in-
formers. To assure performance, each informer is charged with a narcotics
violation, and final disposition is postponed until the defendant has fulfilled
his part of the bargain. To protect the informer, the special squad seeks to
camouflage him in the large body of releasees by not disclosing his identity
even to the arresting precinct officer, who is given no explanation for release.4 '
Thus persons encountered on the street by a uniformed patrolman the day
after their arrest may have been discharged, or they may have been officially
charged and then released on bail or personal recognizance to await trial or
to serve as informers.
40. See STAFF OF Suncom.. oN NARconcs, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MFA.NS,
84TH CO NG., 2D SEss., ILLICIT TRAFFic m NAncorics, BARnITURATs, AND A .uu T -I.Es
Im THE UNITE STATES 11 (Comm. Print ,1956).
Upon questioning individuals on the street, the police are frequently told "I'm working
for the Bureau" or "I'm working for Sergeant - -----screw." For example, the officers
of a cruiser car stopped a car to question the occupants. The driver told the officers
that he was working for the Narcotics Squad and was trying to make a purchase from
the other person in the car. The other person, who was questioned separately, told the
officers that he, too, was an informer-but for the Federal agency, and that he was asso-
dating with the driver in hopes that he would obtain some information relating to the
sale of narcotics.
41. The informer is contacted by the police away from public view. Members of the
Squad refrain from apprehending a suspect making a sale to an informer during a super-
vised purchase. See KYz.-=Y, op. cit. ,ipra note 34, at 10-11:
A. How to cultivate narcotic informants.
2. Above all, do not make arrest with the informant present when said in-
formant has introduced the officer to the peddler. This is called a "burn." Once
an officer or unit secures the reputation of "burning" informants it will be hard
pressed in securing information from informants.
B. How to use narcotic informants for information on other crimes.
2. The officer should keep in mind that the disclosure of an informant's
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While serving as informers, suspects are allowed to engage in illegal activity.
Continued use of narcotics is condoned; the narcotics detective generally is
not concerned with the problem of informants who make buys and use some
of the evidence themselves.4 2 Though informers are usually warned that their
status does not give them a "license to peddle," possession of a substantial
identity will in all probability result in serious injury or possibly death to the
informant.
D. How to properly use informants.
1. Informants must be protected at all times by not revealing identiy [sic]
or disclosing the fact that they are giving information or assistance.
2. Avoid making arrests when informants are present, or so close after
informant-officer-contact that informants are suspected by the violator of
"burning him." This is called a "buy and a bust" with a "burn" of the informant.
3. Always build up in the informant's mind that the officer will never "burn"
him.
For a case requiring that informer's name be disclosed if sought in a pretrial motion for bill
of particulars, see Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 65 n.15 (1957).
42. In one case an informer, who had just made a buy handed the officer ten red
capsules of heroin wrapped in tinfoil and stated that he was keeping two for his trouble.
In no cases observed did the police directly furnish informers with narcotics.
In other jurisdictions, the supplying of addict informers with narcotics by the police
apparently is not uncommon. DEuTscH, THE TaOUBLE WITH Cors 98 (2d ed. 1955),
reports :
The chief of one of our best-policed cities gave me an elaborate rationalization
for the practice:
"We don't hand out dope to an addict who supplies us with information. But if
one comes in, desperate for want of the addicting drug that he can't obtain for one
reason or another, and if he gives us information that we deem valuable, we send
him to the public hospital where a doctor can administer an injection of the drug
for medical reasons, to relieve his suffering."
This chief, along with others who defend the practice, claimed it is almost
impossible to apprehend dope peddlers without the cooperation of their addict
customers.
On quite the other hand, Deutsch reports:
Police Chief John Holstrom of Berkeley, California, makes this observation:
"In Berkeley, we don't trade immunity for information, in so far as toleration
of continued violations is concerned. But we trade in another way. For instance,
if a man is arrested for a petty theft and he tells us he will give us convicting
information on a big narcotics operator if I recommend dismissal of the charge
against him, I wouldn't hesitate to do it-if he comes through with the goods."
Id. at 97.
For a case in which the court takes judicial notice of the use of informer-addicts, see
Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1956). For some evidence on
the extent to which the courts may be involved with the police in the trading of enforce-
ment for information, see Griffin v. Renkert, 121 N.E.2d 171 (Ohio C.P. 1954) (ordering
reinstatement of police detective dismissed for obtaining modification of sentence and
release of a person convicted on charge of possession of lottery slips in order to aid him
in "his subversive" work in checking communism "in certain colored circles").
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amount of narcotics may be excused. In one case, a defendant found guilty of
possession of marijuana argued that she was entitled to be placed on proba-
tion since she had cooperated with the police by testifying against three per-
sons charged with sale of narcotics. The sentencing judge denied her request
because he discovered that her cooperation was related to the possession of a
substantial amount of heroin, an offense for which she was arrested (but never
charged) while on bail for the marijuana violation. A narcotics squad in-
spector, in response to an inquiry from the judge, revealed that the defendant
had not been charged with possession of heroin because she had been co-
operative with the police on that offense.
43
In addition to granting such outright immunity for some violations, the
police wiU recommend to the prosecutor either that an informer's case be
nolle prossed or, more frequently, that the charge be reduced to a lesser of-
fense. And, if the latter course is followed, the police usually recommend to
the judge, either in response to his request for information or in the pre-
sentence report, that informers be placed on probation or given relatively light
sentences. Both the prosecutor and judge willingly respond to police requests
for reducing a charge of sale to a lesser offense because they consider the
mandatory minimum too severe.44 As a result, during a four year period in
this jurisdiction, less than two and one-half per cent of all persons charged
with the sale of narcotics were convicted of that offense.
The narcotics squad's policy of trading full enforcement for information is
justified on the grounds that apprehension and prosecution of the "big sup-
plier" is facilitated. The absence of any in the city is attributed to this policy.
As one member of the squad said, "[The city] is too hot. There are too many
informants." A basic, though untested, assumption of the policy is that ridding
the city of the "big supplier" is the key to solving its narcotics problem. Even
if this assumption were empirically validated, the desirability of continuing
such a policy cannot be established without taking into account its total im-
pact on the administration of criminal justice in the city, the state, and the
43. On imposing a sentence of two to ten years, the judge said that her cooperation
in the heroin offense did not place any moral obligation on him or the police depart-
ment as to her sentence for the marijuana charge. Had she been charged and convicted
on both counts, the maximum could have been twenty years. A third conviction for
possession would carry a mandatory twenty years minimum with a possible maximum of
forty years.
In another case an informer for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics sold heroin capsules
to an informer of the.city narcotics squad. The Federal informer was arrested by the city
police and charged. Following consultation Nvith Federal agents the case was nolle prosscd.
On the widespread use of informers and police protection of them, see Kooken, Ethics
in Police Service, 38 J. Cans. L. & CmmixoLoGy 172, 174-75 (1947).
44. The police work under specific instructions from the judges to notify them
of those cases in which they wish to have imposed the heavy mandatory sentences pre-
scribed by statute. For an example of a trial court penalizing a defendant because of
her failure to cooperate as an informant, see State v. Carter, Conn. LJ., Nov. 4, 1958,
pp. 14, 15 (Sentence Rev. Div.) (sentence review decision reducing sentence).
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nation. Yet no procedure has been designed to enable the police and other key
administrators of criminal justice to obtain such an appraisal.45 The extent
and nature of the need for such a procedure can be illustrated, despite the
limitations of available data,4 6 by presenting in the form of a mock report some
of the questions, some of the answers, and some of the proposals a Policy
Appraisal and Review Board might consider.
47
Following a description of the informer program, a report might ask:
To what extent, if at all, has the legislature delegated to the police the
authority to grant, or obtain a grant of, complete or partial immunity from
prosecution, in exchange for information about narcotics suppliers? No pro-
visions of the general immunity or narcotics statutes authorize the police to
exercise such discretion. The general immunity statute requires a high degree
of visibility by providing that immunity be allowed only on a written motion
by the prosecuting attorney to the court and that the information given be
reduced to writing under the direction of the judge to preclude future prose-
cution for the traded offense or offenses.48 The narcotics statutes, unlike com-
parable legislation concerning other specific crimes, make no provision for
obtaining information by awarding immunity from prosecution. Nor is there
any indication, other than possibly in the maximum sentences authorized, 40
that the legislature intended that certain narcotics offenses be given high
priority or be enforced at the expense of other offenses. What evidence there
is of legislative intent suggests the contrary; this fact is recognized 'by the
local police manual. And nothing in the statute providing for the establish-
ment of local police departments can 'be construed to authorize the policy of
trading enforcement for information. That statute makes full enforcenent a
duty of the police. The narcotics squad has ignored this mandate and adopted
an informer policy which appears to constitute a usurpation of legislative fune-
45. Such tasks might, in part at least, be assumed by the department's "Research
and Planning" unit. It has, however, been primarily concerned with collecting statistics
and with such administrative considerations as geographic boundaries, patrol districts,
and the use of one or two man squad cars.
46. This comment is not intended as a criticism of the work done by the American
Bar Foundation. However, unlike such an overall survey, research initiated by a Policy
Appraisal and Review Board would focus on a specific problem and be designed to answer
questions formulated in the light of an articulated set of assumptions about the functions
and purposes of the criminal law and the place of the police in its administration.
47. For an attempt to define the functions, location, and composition of a Policy
Appraisal and Review Board, see text following note 98 infra.
48. For legislative recognition that, information should' not be compelled under an
immunity statute where such information would subject the informant, as in most narcotics
cases, to jeopardy in another jurisdiction, see CA. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 1324 (Supp.),
which was amended to provide that immunity could not be ordered if the court finds
"that to do so ... could subject the witness to a criminal prosecution in another juris-
diction... ." See also United States v. Bonanno, 178 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
49. Cf. L---- v. M-.... 326 S.W.2d 751, 756 & n.1l (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (authorized
punishment for perjury far more severe than for adultery, therefore perjury the greater
offense).
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tion. It does not follow that the police must discontinue employing informers'
but they ought to discontinue trading enforcement for information until the
legislature, the court,51 or the prosecutor 52 explicitly initiates such a program.
Whether the police policy of trading enforcement for information should be
proposed for legislative consideration would depend upon the answers to some
of the questions which follow.
Does trading enforcewnt for information fulfill the retributivc, restraining,
and reformative functions of the state's narcotics laws? By in effect licensing
the user-informer to satisfy his addiction and assuring the peddler-informer,
who may also be a user, that he will obtain dismissal or reduction of the pend-
ing charge to a lesser offense, the police undermine, if not negate, the retribu-
tive and restraining functions of the narcotics laws. In addition, the com-
munity is deprived of an opportunity to subject these offenders, particularly
the addicts, to treatment aimed at reformation. In fact, the police ironically
acknowledge the inconsistency of their program with the goal of treatment;
"cured" addicts are not used as informers for fear that exposure to narcotics
might cause their relapse. A comparison of the addict-release policies of the
police, sentencing judge, and probation and parole authorities demonstrates
the extent to which the administration of criminal justice can be set awry by
a police nonenforcement program. At one point on the continuum, the police
release the addict to informer status so that he can maintain his association
with peddlers and users. The addict accepts such status on the tacit condition
that continued use will be condoned. At other points on the continuum, the
judge and probation and parole authorities make treatment a condition of
an addict's release and continued use or even association with narcotics users
the basis for revoking probation or parole.53 Thus the inherent conflict be-
tween basic purposes of the criminal law is compounded by conflicts among
key decision-points in the process.
Does trading enforcement for information implement the deterrent fuinc-
tion of crindual law adminstration? If deterrence depends-and little if any-
50. The role. of the informer generally in the enforcement of the criminal law is
beyond the scope of this Article, though it would be wvell within the scope of a Policy
Appraisal and Review Board.' For excellent discussions of many of the policies and
problems involved in the employment of informers, see Donnelly, Judicial Control of
Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YA= UJ. 1091 (1951).
See also Comment, An-Inforner's Tale: Its Use in Judicial and Admihistrative Pro-
ceedings, 63 YAIt L.J. 206 (1953).
51. -See New -aven Evening .Register, July 30, 1959, p. 7, col. 1 (state police seizure
of. pinball-machines forbidden by superior court judge until question of legality settled
by state supreme court).- .
52. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1957, p. 10, col. 1 (Attorney General Rogers: "Until
Congress has had a chance to clarify this [whether Justice Department can prosecute
state officers for wiretapping], we're not going to prosecute any state officials."). On
prosecutor pronouncements being made part of an official record, and on prosecutor dis-
cretion not to invoke the criminal process, see notes 20 & 28 .snpra.
53. The United States also conditions release upon agreement by the releasee:
10. That I will not purchase, process, use, consume, or administer narcotic drugs
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thing is really known about the deterrent impact of the criminal law-in part
at least, upon the potential offender's perception of law enforcement, the in-
former policy can have only a negative effectr'4 In addition to the chance of
nondetection which accompanies the commission of all crimes in varying de-
grees, the narcotics suspect has four-to-one odds that he will not be charged
following detection and arrest. And he has a high expectation, even if charged,
of obtaining a reduction or dismissal of an accurate charge. These figures re-
flect and reinforce the offender's view of the administration of criminal justice
as a bargaining process initiated either by offering information "to do himself
some good" or by a member of the narcotics squad advising the uninformed
suspect, the "new offender," of the advantages of disclosing his narcotics
"connections." Such law enforcement can have little, if any, deterrent impact.
or marihuana ... or frequent places where such articles are unlawfully sold,
dispensed, used, or given away.
12. That I will not associate with persons having a criminal background, bad
reputation, or those engaged in questionable occupations.
Statement of the conditions under which certificate of conditional release is issued, in
Letter From James V. Bennett, Director of Federal Prisons, Washington, D.C., to
Joseph Goldstein, Sept. 6, 1957. See also MODEL PENAL CODE, § 305.17 Conditions of
Parole (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
54. It is recognized that no empirical studies adequately test the validity of the
assumption that enforcement of the criminal law has a deterrent effect. But it seems
clear that without Aull enforcement in practice for a substantial period of time, possibly even
for generations, there can be no reliable basis for such studies. See Andenaes, General
Prevention--Illu-sion or Reality?, 43 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 176 (1952). See also FLUGa,
MAN, MORALS AND SocIETY 35 (1945), where discussion of the super-ego as a mechanism
of control prompts the thought that before deterrent impact can be determined experi-
ments would have to be conducted over several generations:
The second source [of the super-ego] is from the process of "introjection"
or incorporation into one's own mind of the precepts and moral attitudes of others,
particularly of one's parents or of other persons in loco parcutis in one's youth.
As a result of this process, the attitudes of impressive persons in one's early en-
vironment (and to some extent throughout life) become a permanent part of one's
own mental structure, become "second nature," as the popular expression has it.
Through this process, too, moral standards and conventions become handed on
from one generation to another, thus giving permanence and stability to the codes
and traditions of society.
55. This statement, as most conclusions about deterrent effect, remains unverified.
E.g., BARNES & TEMTRS, Naw HoluzoNs IN CRIMINOLOGY 626 (3d ed. 1959):
...there can be no doubt that. certainty of apprehension and conviction for
criminal behavior is the first and most indispensable item in securing the immediate
reduction in the volume and variety of crime. An honest and expert police system
is the only answer to efficient apprehension.
Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 144 (1953):
On the concrete level of individual experience .... he [the policeman] is the
living embodiment of domestic law. If he conforms to that law, he becomes the
most important official in the entire hierarchy, able to facilitate the progressively
greater realization of democratic values.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
(Vol. 69. 543
HeinOnline -- 69 Yale L.J. 570 1959-1960
POLICE DISCRETION
That the "big supplier," an undefined entity, has been discouraged from
using the city as a headquarters was confirmed by a local federal agent and
a United States attorney in testimony before a Senate committee investigating
illicit narcotics traffic. They attributed the result, however, to the state's high
mandatory minimum sentence for selling, not to the informer policy. In fact,
that municipal police policy was not made visible at the hearings.5 It was
neither mentioned in their testimony nor in the testimony of the chief of police
and the head of the narcotics squad. These local authorities may have reasoned
that since the mandatory sentence facilitates the recruitment of informers who,
in turn, are essential to keeping the "big supplier" outside city limits, the
legislature's sentencing policy could be credited with the "achievement."
Whether the police informer program, the legislature's sentencing policy,
both, or neither, caused the "big supplier" to locate elsewhere is not too
significant; the traffic and use of narcotics in the city remain major prob-
lems.57 Since user-demand is maintained, if not increased, by trading enforce-
ment for information, potential and actual peddlers are encouraged to supply
the city's addicts. Testimony before the Senate committee indicates that al-
though the "big suppliers" have moved their headquarters to other cities, there
are now in the city a large number of small peddlers serving a minimum of
1,500 and in all probability a total of 2,500 users, and that the annual ex-
penditure for illicit narcotics in the city is estimated at not lower than ten and
probably as high as eighteen million dollars. Evaluated in terms of deterrent
effect, the program of trading enforcement for information to reach the "big
supplier" has failed to implement locally the ultimate objective of the narcotics
laws--reducing addiction. Furthermore, the business of the "big supplier" has
not been effectively deterred. At best suppliers have been discouraged from
56. But the supervisor of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics for this jurisdiction ac-
knowledged his bureau's use of "special employees."
57. The following exchange took place in congressional hearings:
Senator. You have gotten rid of your bigger peddlers, but now, it would seem
to me, having listened through the whole day, you have reduced it here in (city]
to a bunch of smaller peddlers, like the girl who testified a minute ago ....
Mr. X. [U.S. Attorney for the District].
That's right. -
Senator. And you have got the addicts on the street, and you are going to have
plenty of drug addiction in this city, and in this State until there is some
effective way of getting these addicts either into a hospital, or if that fails, if
they won't take that treatment, into the jails or farms or colonies. Don't you
think that's it?
Mr. X. I very definitely agree.
58. For a characterization of the "big supplier," see Statement of Assistant Com-
missioner, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics, Harney, in Hearings on HR. 348 and HR. 3490
Before the Subcomnittee on Narcotics of the House Committee o) Ways and Means,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1951) :
Narcotic commerce is no crime of accident or impulse or occasion. It is a
carefully studied way of life. It depends on deliberate and calculated scheming
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basing their operations in the city, -which continues to be a lucrative market.
Thus ,by maintaining the market, local policy, although a copy of national
policy, may veiy well hinder the efforts of the Federal Narcotics Bureau."0
A report of a Policy Appraisal and Review Board might find: "Trading
little ones for big ones" is outside the ambit of municipal police discretion and
should continue to remain so because it conflicts with the basic objectives of
the criminal law. Retribution, restraint, and reformation are subverted by a
policy which condones the use and possession of narcotics. And deterrence
cannot be enhanced 'by a police program which provides potential and actual
suppliers and users with more illustrations of nonenforcement than enforce-
ment.
A report might conclude by exploring and suggesting alternative programs
for coping with the narcotics problem. No attempt will be made here to ex-
haust or detail all possible alternatives. An obvious one would be a rigorous
program of full enforcement designed to dry up, or at least drastically reduce,
local consumer and peddler demand for illicit narcotics. If information cur-
rently obtained from suspects is essential and worth a price, compensation
might be given to informers, with payments deferred until a suspect's final
release. Such a program would neither -undermine the retributive and re-
straining objectives of the criminal law nor deprive the community of an
opportunity to impose rehabilitation regimes on the offender. Funds provided
by deferred payments might enhance an offender's chances of getting off to a
good start upon release. 60 Moreover, changing the picture presently perceived
and diligently developed sources of supply, on carefully cultivated outlets and
customers. This is a degraded business where the attendant human misery is
completely discounted for the profit consideration. That profit is alluring. A
$1,000 investment may be doubled merely by crossing a street between a wholesaler
and a waiting customer with a few ounces of heroin. Obviously the criminal
will assume some risks in such an attractive business.
He calculates these risks exactly. His is such an easily hidden business that
he knows that it might take officers of the law months to catch him at the exact
moment when competent evidence is available against him. He knows the quality
and amount of the narcotic law enforcement in the community; he knows whether
narcotic cases move promptly on the criminal calendar or are stagnated for months;
he knows the quality of prosecution; above'all, he knows what is the likely payoff
in the way of a sentence. These professionals do not just reckon sentences in the
gross amount of time imposed. They can almost instantly figure the amount of
good time and industrial good time which might be forthcoming on any kind of a
sentence. They know under just what circumstances probation or parole is likely
to be granted. Fear is the only consideration which will deter most of these
people. We would like to see the risks enhanced in this dirty business.
59. To the extent that this is an international problem, it is clearly a problem for
federal authorities. See Renborg, International Control of Narcotics, 22 LAw & CoNm MIl'.
PRoB. 86 (1957).
60. Such a device might facilitate the effectiveness of a statits elevation ceremony. See
APPENDIX I, at 590 infra. 'By adopting a deferred payment program for informers, the real
inadequacies of release funds for offenders might be exposed and might, if successful, even
prompt the-payment of funds to anyone released from custody to enhance the opportunity
for rehabilitation. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4284 (1958).
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by potential violators from nonenforcement to enforcement would at least not
preclude the possibility of deterrence. Such a program might even facilitate
the apprehension of "big suppliers" who, faced with decreasing demand, might
either be forced to discontinue serving the city because sales would no longer
be profitable or to adopt bolder sales methods which would expose them to
easier detection.
Full enforcement will place the legislature in a position to evaluate its nar-
cotics laws by providing a basis for answering such questions as: Will full
enforcement increase the price of narcotics to the user? Will such inflation
increase the frequency of crimes committed to finance narcotics purchases ?0
Or will full enforcement reduce the number of users and the frequency of
connected crimes? Will too great or too costly an administrative burden be
placed on the prosecutor's office and the courts by fhdl enforcenment? Will cor-
rectional institutions be filled beyond "effective" capacity? The answers to
these questions are now buried or obscured by decisions not to invoke the
criminal process.
6 2
Failure of a full enforcement program might prompt a board recommenda-
tion to increase treatment or correctional personnel and facilities. Or a board,
recognizing that full enforcement would be either too costly or inherently in-
effective, might propose the repeal of statutes prohibiting the use and sale of
narcotics and/or the enactment, as part of a treatment program, of legisla-
tion authorizing sales to users at a low -price. Such legislative action would
be designed to reduce use and connected offenses to a minimum. By taking
profits out of sales it would lessen peddler incentive to create new addicts and
eliminate the need to support the habit by the commission of crimes.
These then are the kinds of questions, answers, and proposals a Policy
Appraisal and Review Board might explore in its report examining this par-
ticular type of police decision not to invoke the criminal process.
IV
Another low visibility situation which an Appraisal and Review Board
might uncover in this municipality stems from police decisions not to invoke
the felonious assault laws unless the victim signs a complaint.0 Like the ad-
dict-informer, the potential complainant in an assault case is both the victim
of an offense and a key source of information. But unlike him, the complain-
61. See Finestone, Narcotics and Crimiality, 22 LAw & CONTErp. Pron. 69 (1957);
Harney, The Police and Narcotics Enforcenment, THE POLICE YEARooK 95, 100 (1952)
(Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics).
62. To the extent that these and other questions reflect some of the real pressures
behind nonenforcement, they may be made more readily visible by a board proposal to
initiate a program of full enforcenwnt against all narcotics violators and thus, even without
implementation of the proposal, cause the legislature to reexamine existing legislation.
63. Police decisions not to invoke the criminal process in assault cases involving a
willing or insistent complainant are not examined. The frustrated victim may make such
decisions visible for example, by -complaining to the prosecutor or grand jury or by seek-
19601
HeinOnline -- 69 Yale L.J. 573 1959-1960
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ant, who is not a suspect, and whose initial contact with the police is generally
self-imposed, is not placed under pressure to bargain. And in contrast with
the informer program, the police assault program was clearly not designed,
if designed at all, to effectuate an identifiable policy.
During one month under the nonenforcement program of a single precinct,
thirty-eight out of forty-three felonious assault cases, the great majority in-
volving stabbings and cuttings, were cleared "because the victim refused to
prosecute."0 4 This program, which is coupled with a practice of not encourag-
ing victims to sign complaints, reduces the pressure of work by eliminating
such tasks as apprehending and detaining suspects, writing detailed reports,
applying for warrants to prefer charges and appearing in court at inconvenient
times for long periods without adequate compensation.", As one officer ex-
ing to initiate newspaper or crime commission investigations. See 7 W. REs. L. REV. 203,
204-05 (1956); 1957 CHICAGO CitmE Coml r. ANN. RiP. 37-39.
The exercise of police discretion in misdemeanor assaults is not discussed. In such
cases, the police similarly avoid what they view to be their problem by placing the
burden of initiating criminal prosecution on the victim. Unless the assault occurs in the
officer's presence, he does not have authority in this jurisdiction to arrest the offender
without a warrant and can cite this lack of authority as a basis for his decision not to
proceed. Of course, this does not fully explain his decision, for he might further investigate
the case and obtain a warrant for arrest. The victim is usually referred to detectives
who will assist in obtaining a warrant. Experience has indicated that the victim rarely
will take the initiative necessary to contact the detectives in order to bring criminal
charges.
64. The police are frequently made aware of the offense by victims apparently more
anxious to obtain ambulance service to the hospital than to initiate apprehension and
prosecution of an assailant. If hospitalization is required, the police arrest the offender
even though the complainant may not wish to prosecute. When such arrests are made, the
police conduct a "minimum type" investigation to assure that the basic facts will be
available should the victim die and murder or manslaughter become the more appropriate
charge for the state, as complainant, to lodge against the offender. The police decision
to arrest, however, does not reflect any intention to further invoke the process because
of the seriousness of the injury inflicted. For soon after the disturbing event, in an
effort to close the case, the police will ask the hospitalized victim to decide whether
prosecution should be initiated. Though his condition may cast doubt about his com-
petence to understand and respond to such an inquiry, in at least one case the victim
demonstrated complete awareness. Shortly before his death for which the assailant was
subsequently charged with murder, he replied from his hospital bed, "I want to see whether
or not I live first."
The police will also make arrests, even if the complainant does not wish to prosecute,
if the suspect has offered to pay off the complainant or if the suspect is a "known
criminal" whom the police wish to get off the street. The decision to invoke the process
in these cases is equally a reflection of the private value system of the police. In these
cases the state acts as complainant and the victim is subpoenaed to appear at trial. See
Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, I So. CAL. L. REv. 1, & nn.3-5 (1927) (on
compounding crime as a separate offense).
65. A decision to arrest may be influenced by the time an offense occurs and the
time the police officer is scheduled to go off and return to duty. An officer assigned to
the vice squad explained, for example, that officers will not make an arrest on Saturday
night if they can avoid it since court appearance is likely to be scheduled for their day off.
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plained, "run-of-the-mill" felonious assaults are so common in his precinct
that prosecution of each case would force patrolmen to spend too much time
in court and leave too little time for investigating other offenses. This ration-
alization exposes the private value system of individual officers as another
policy-shaping factor. Some policemen feel, for example, that assault is an
acceptable means of settling disputes among Negroes, and that when both as-
sailant and victim are Negro, there is no immediately discernible harm to the
public which justifies a decision to invoke the criminal process6C Anticipation
of dismissal by judge and district attorney of cases in which the victim is an
uncooperative witness, the police claim, has been another operative factor in
the development of the assault policy.67 A Policy Appraisal and Review Board,
whose investigators had been specifically directed to examine the assault
policy, should be able to identify these or other policy-shaping factors more
And no matter what the duration of his court appearance, the officer receives credit for
only two hours work.
66. In such cases the police do not attribute their unwillingness to act on any legal
restriction placed upon them or any particular difficulty which they may encounter in
taking the case to court. Other expressions of private and possibly community value
systems are found in police decisions, for example, not to proceed against an elderly
gentleman for larceny of a ham ("You are 74 years old-for crying out loud we don't
want tolock you up for something like that..." the lieutenant said), or to take home
an upper class drunk while locking up a "drunken bum."
67. The courts dismiss or prosecutors decline to proceed with these cases possibly
to reduce their workload as a means of "system maintenance." Commenting on similar
prosecutor practices in another jurisdiction, a police officer with twenty-eight years of
service reflected:
The next weak link in the chain of justice is the prosecutor who fails to file on crooks
because the "victim refuses, to prosecute." It is the business of the prosecutor, not
the victim, to conduct the prosecution. That's what he's elected and paid to do.
If the victim shows a tendency to refuse to cooperate, the laws, if adequate, would
take care of that situation. The lazy or timid prosecutor uses various excuses, such
as illegal search, lack of evidence, etc., and too often he goes into the trial of a
criminal without advance preparation, and the slick defense mouthpieces make a
monkey of him.
Johnson, Some Thoughts on Crime Prevention, TnE POLICE YEV.xoox 146, 147 (1953).
For a statute authorizing the court, in its discretion, to nolle prosequi cases involving
certain specified offenses following a settlement by complainant and the offender, see
P. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 491 (1958). In contrast, see NVAsnimN oN, D.C., PouLcE
DEP'T MANUAL Ch. 2, § 12 (1948); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE Dm'T RuLs & REcs.
§ 491 (1951) (prohibiting police officers from arranging or participating in compromises
between victims and suspects).
Anticipated court responses manifest themselves in other police decisions to enforce or
not to enforce. The police may decide not to enforce particular offenses if the judge
assigned to the criminal docket is "known" to be lenient re the specific offense. Another
view, on paper at least, is to be found in the following catechism from Nnw BEDFOaD,
MAss., POLICE DEP'T RULEs & REns. 38, (1957): "Of what interest is it to a policeman
if a complaint against a prisoner is dismissed by the court? None whatever; a policeman's
duty is accomplished when he brings his prisoner to the station, and presents his case
in court."
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precisely. Yet on the basis of the data available, a board could tentatively
conclude that court and prosecutor responses do not explain why the police
have -failed to adopt a policy of encouraging assault victims to sign complaints,
and, therefore, that the private value system of department members, As re-
flected in their attitude toward workload and in a stereotypical view of the
Negro, is of primary significance.
Once some of the major policy-shaping factors have been identified, an
Appraisal and Review Board might formulate and attempt to answer the fol-
lowing or similar questions: Would it be consistent with any of the purposes
of the criminal law to authorize police discretion in cases of felonious assaults
as well as other specified offenses? Assuming that it would be consistent or
at least more realistic to authorize police discretion in some cases, what limita-
tions and guides, if any, should the legislature provide? Should legislation
provide that factors such as workload, willingness of victims or certain victims
to sign a complaint, the degree of violence and attitude of prosecutor and
judge be taken into account in the exercise of police discretion? If workload
is to be recognized, should the legislature establish priorities of enforcement
designed to assist the police in deciding which offenses among equally press-
ing ones are to be ignored or enforced? If assaults are made criminal in order
to reduce threats to community peace and individual security, should a vic-
tim's willingness to prosecute, if he happens to live,08 be relevant to the ex-
ercise of police discretion? Does resting prosecution in the hands of the victim
encourage him to "get even" with the assailant through retaliatory lawless-
ness? Or does such a policy place the decision in the hands of the assailant
whose use of force has already demonstrated an ability and willingness to
fulfill a threat?
Can the individual police officer, despite his own value system, sufficiently
respond to officially articulated community values to be delegated broad
powers of discretion ?"9 If not, can or should procedures be designed to enable
68. See note 64 supra.
69. The police officer is confronted with a most difficult task .... He must bring
under control his personal sentiments and prejudices and subordinate them in a
truly professional spirit .... He must refrain from expressing private notions in
discharging the duties of office. This entails a capacity to distinguish between his
own right as a private citizen to his private convictions and his responsibilities as
a police officer.
LOHMAN, THE POLICE AND MINORITY GROUPS 5 (1947) (manual prepared for use in the
Chicago Park District Training School).
The Negro is aware of "the law" only as an agent of the white community.
The police act directly upon the Negro to keep him "in his place." The effect has
been that many southern Negroes ... continue to regard the policeman as a natural
enemy. The only manner in which the confidence of all groups can be won is by
impartial and vigorous enforcement of the law. Absolute impartiality requires
that the law be enforced against all violators. The idea that race, creed, or nation-
ality are extenuating factors, permitting of different applications of the law, must
be abandoned .... The police officer who is tempted to vary his role according
[Vol. 69:5 43
HeinOnline -- 69 Yale L.J. 576 1959-1960
POLICE DISCRETION
the police department to translate these values into rules and regulations for
individual policemen? Can police officers or the department be trained to
evaluate the extent to which current practice undermines a major criminal
law objective of imposing upon all persons officially recognized minimum
standards of human behavior? For example, can the individual officer of the
department be trained to evaluate the effect of decisions in cases of felonious
assault among Negroes on local programs for implementing national or state
policies of integration in school, employment, and housing, and to determine
the extent to which current policy weakens or reinforces stereotypes which
are used to justify not only police policy, but more importantly, opposition to
desegregation programs ?"0 Or should legislation provide that the police invoke
the process in all felonious assault cases unless the prosecutor or court pub-
licly provide them in recorded documents with authority and guides for exer-
cising discretion, and thus make visible both the policy of nonenforcement and
the agency or agencies responsible for it?
Some of these issues were considered and resolved by the Oakland, Cali-
fornia, Police Department in 1957 when, after consultation with prosecutors
and judges, it decided to abandon a similar assault policy and seek full en-
forcement.71 Chief of Police W. W. Vernon, describing Oakland's new pro-
gram, wrote:
to personal notions as to the worth of various groups is himself in violation of
the law. An officer has a capacity for delivering equal justice only to the extent
that he has this problem under control.
Id. at 100.
70. See generally Riddleberger & Motz, Prejudice and Perception, 62 Am. J. Soc-
oLoGY 498 (1957) ; Yarrow, Campbell, & Yarrow, Ihaerperso:al Dynarnic.s in Racial Inte-
gralion, in MACOBY, NEWCOMB & HARTLEY, R-ADINGS IN SOCIAL PSyCnOLOGY 623, 639,34
(3d ed. 1958); Johnson, The Stereotype of the American Negro, in KLI.EEWn, CHAn-
AcTmEusncs OF THE A-mmuCAN NEGRO 3 (1944) ; KEPHArr, RACIAL FAcroas AND UwmiN
LAw ENx-ORCEm.NT 69, 75-107 (1957); Bastide & Van den Berghe, Stereotypes, Norms
and Interracial Behavior in Sao Paulo, Brad!il, 22 Am. SOCIOL.OGICAL REv. 689, 691 (1957).
Query: To what extent should the customs of an identifiable subcultural group or a
person's membership in that group be taken into account as a mitigating or aggravating
factor in the imposition of sanctions or as a defense to a crime? For some of the problems
and difficulties involved in attempting to formulate a policy which defines and takes into
account subcultural differences, see charge to the jury in Regina v. Muddarubba, Austl.
N. Terr. Sup. Ct., Feb. 2, 1956, reprinted in Donnelly, Goldstein & Schwartz, Cases on
Problems Arising in the Promulgation, Administration and Enforcement of a Law of
Crimes, 2d tent. ed., Jan. 1959, ch. III, at 619 (mimeo on file in Yale Law Library):
Regina v. Mfacekequnake, 28 Ont. 309 (1897).
71. Police Academy, Oakland, Cal., Police Dep't, Instructors' Material, Vol. 6, Bull.
No. 35, Aug. 26, 1957, p. 2. For a statement of a similar policy, see NEW Yo.U,- CITY,
N.Y., POLICE DEa'T RuLms & PRocEDUREs ch. 12, § 12.0 (1956) ("When an arrest i,
made and the complainant is reluctant to prosecute, a subpoena will be obtained from the
magistrate having jurisdiction, to secure the attendance of the complainant, so that
the ends of justice may not be defeated!') Another manual urges police education of the
public "with a viev toward soliciting cooperation of all persons in reporting violations."
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, POLICE MANUAL Cl. XI, § 19 (1951).
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In our assault cases for years we had followed this policy of releasing the
defendant if the complainant did not feel aggrieved to the point of being
willing to testify. . . . [Since] World War II . . . our assault cases in-
creased tremendously to the point where we decided to do something
about the increase .... 72
Training materials prepared 'by the Oakland Police Academy disclose that be-
tween 1952 and 1956, while the decision to prosecute was vested in the victim,
the rate of reported felonious assaults rose from 93 to 161 per 100,000 popu-
lation and the annual number of misdemeanor assaults rose from 618 to
2,630.73 The materials emphasize that these statistics mean a workload of
"nearly 10 assault reports a day every day of the year." But they stress:
The important point about these figures is not so much that they rep-
resent a substantial police workload, which they do, but more important,
that they indicate an increasing lack of respect for the laws of society by
a measurable segment of our population, and a corresponding threat to
the rest of the citizens of our city. The police have a clear responsibility
to develop respect for the law among those who disregard it in order to
insure the physical safety and well-being of those who do.
W e recognize -that the problem exists mainly because the injured per-
son has refused to sign a complaint against the perpetrator. The injured
person has usually refused to sign for two reasons: first, because of threats
of future bodily harm or other action by the perpetrator and, secondly,
because it has been a way of life among some people to adjust grievances
by physical assaults and not by the recognized laws of society which are
available to them.
We, the police, have condoned these practices to some extent by not
taking advantage of the means at our disposal; that is, by not gathering
sufficient evidence and signing complaints on information and belief in
those cases where the complainant refuses to prosecute. The policy and
procedure of gathering sufficient evidence and signing complaints on in-
formation and belief should instill in these groups the realization that the
laws of society must be resorted to in settling disputes. When it is realized
by many of these people that we will sign complaints ourselves and will
72. Letter From W. W. Vernon to Joseph Goldstein, Sept. 24, 1958.
73. Police Academy, Oakland, Cal., Police Dep't, op. cit. supra note 71, at 3 :
Reported to
Felony Assaults Police Arrests Charged
(For year 1956) 618 350 67
(1st 6 mos. of 1957) 394 197 62
Misdemeanor Assaudts
(For year 1956) 2631 941 454
(1st 6 mos. of 1957) 1322 522 not
available
(Note the difference between the number arrested and the number charged. The
difference is attributed to the fact that the type of people involved do not prosecute
in physical assault cases.)
(Emphasis added.)
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not condone fighting and cuttings, many of them will stop such prac-
tices.74
Following conferences with the police, the local prosecutors and judges
pledged their support for the new assault program. 5 The district attorney's
office will deny a complainant's request that a case be dropped and suggest
that it be addressed to the judge in open court. The judge, in turn, wsill advise
the complainant that the case cannot be dismissed, and that a perjury, con-
-tempt, or false-report complaint will be issued in "appropriate cases" 70 against
the victim who denies facts originally alleged.17 The polica have been advised
that the court and prosecutor will actively cooperate in the implementation
of the new program, but that every case will not result in a complaint since
it is the "job [of the police] to turn in the evidence and it's the Prosecuting
Attorney's job to determine when a complaint will be issued."78 Thus the role
of each of the key decisionmaking agencies with preconviction invoking au-
thority is clearly delineated and integrated.
With the inauguration of a new assault policy, an Appraisal and Review
Board might establish procedures for determining how effectively the objec-
tives of the policy are fulfilled in practice. A board might design intelligence
retrieving devices which would provide more complete data than the follow-
ing termed by Chief Vernon "the best evidence that our program is accom-
plishing the purpose for which it was developed... ."T0 Prior to the adoption
of the new policy, eighty per cent of the felonious assault cases "cleared" were
cleared because "Complainant Refuses To Prosecute," while only thirty-two
and two-tenths per cent of the clearances made during the first three months
74. Id. at 3-4; see Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Socielty, 28 IND. LJ. 133, 153
(1953):
Discriminatory law enforcement, including the failure to protect Negroes from the
aggression of other Negroes, aggravates tendencies toward criminal behavior. Equal
enforcement of law by the police would have a curative, morale building effect which
would be of the greatest value in critical situations.
75. In commenting on this procedure our courts and prosecutors have said:
Since battery, assault, disturbing the peace and similar offenses are public offenses
under our State laws, the public has a right to see such offenders brought before
the courts, even though the victim or complainant is reluctant or indifferent. When
the police are called upon to investigate and arrest such offenders and the ensuing
judicial processes are set in motion, the public has a right to have these processes
given meaning, without being frustrated or rendered useless at the whim of the
complaining witness.
Letter From W. W. Vernon to Herman Goldstein, then Assistant Director, Governmental
Research Institute, Hartford, Connecticut, July 3, 1958, copy on file in author's office:
accord, Taylor v. State, 214 Md. 156, 133 A.2d 414 (1957) (consent of prosecuting witness
no defense to charge of assault with intent to commit sodomy).
76. Police Academy, Oakland, Cal., Police Dep't, op. cit. sitpra note 71.
77. CAI. PENAL CoDE ANN. §§ 118, 118a (perjury), 166(6) (contempt), 143.5 (false
report of criminal offense) (Supp.).
78. Policy Academy, Oakland, Cal., Police Dep't, op. cit. supra note 71.
79. Chief W.W. Vernon, Assault Cases Memorandum to All Line-Ups, May 9, 1958.
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in 1958 were for that reason, even though the overall clearance rate rose dur-
ing that period.80 And "during the first quarter of this year Felony Assaults
dropped 11.1 per cent below the same period last year, and in March they
were 35.6 per cent below March of last year. Battery cases were down 19.0
per cent for the first three months of 1958.'"81 An Appraisal and Review
Board might attempt to determine the extent to which the police in cases
formerly dropped because "Complainant Refused To Testify" have consciously
or otherwise substituted another reason for "case cleared." And it might esti-
mate the extent to which the decrease in assaults reported reflects, if it does,
a decrease in the actual number of assaults or only a decrease in the number
of victims willing to report assaults. Such followup investigations and what
actually took place in Oakland on an informal basis between police, prosecu-
tor, and judge illustrate some of the functions an Appraisal and Review Board
might regularly perform.
V.
Police decisions to harass, though generally perceived as overzealous en-
forcement, constitute another body of nonenforcement activities meriting in-
vestigation by an Appraisal and Review Board. Harassment is the imposition by
the police, acting under color of law, of sanctions prior to conviction as a means
of ultimate punishment, rather than as a device for the invocation of criminal
proceedings. Characteristic of harassment are efforts to annoy certain "of-
fenders" both by temporarily detaining or arresting them without intention to
seei prosecution and by destroying or illegally seizing their property without
any intention to use it as evidence.8 2 Like other police decisions not to in-
80. Ibid. "In 1956 86.5% of the reported Misdemeanor Assaults were cleared, and
53.4% of these Clearances were on the basis of non-cooperation of complainants. In the
first quarter of 1958 the Clearance Rate was up to 92.9% and only 15.9% of these cases were
cleared as Complainant Refuses to Prosecute." Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. This definition of harassment excludes, therefore, the lawful arrests of "golden
rule" drunks whom the police intend to release the next morning, the apprehension and
detention of material witnesses, arrests or searches of doubtful legality engaged in to
determine the limits of due process, and finally "letter of the law" enforcement which
is frequently mislabled harassment. For an account of the development of the Golden
Rule Police Policy in late nineteenth century, see Bremner, Police, Penal and Parole
Policies in Cleveland and Toledo: The Civic Revival in Ohio, 14 Am. J. Ecoxomics &
SociLoov 387 (1955).
On "letter of the law" enforcement as "harassment," see N.Y. Times, June 29, 1958,
p. 54, cols. 5-6:
A farmer has asked Governor Harriman to call an immediate session of the
legislature, if necessary, to stop state troopers from "harassing" him and other
farmers with vehicle and traffic law technicalities.
... He predicted that enforcement of certain statutes, if applied to the move-
ment of agriculture equipment from one part of a farm to another on state high-
ways, "will mean the end of farming in New York State."
He said he was challenging strict interpretation of . . . the new section of
the law, 1164 (b), which after next Monday will require stop-and-turn signal lamps
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yoke the criminal process, harassment is generally of extremely low visibility, s
probably because the police ordinarily restrict such activity to persons who
are unable to afford the costs of litigation, who would, or think they would,
command little respect even if they were to complain, or who wish to keep
themselves out of public view in order to continue their illicit activities.84 Like
the informer program, harassment is conducted by the police in an atmosphere
of cooperation with other administrators of criminal justice. Since harassment,
by definition, is outside the rule of law, any benefits attributed to such police
activity cannot justify its continuation. An Appraisal and Review Board, how-
ever, would not limit its investigations to making such a finding. It would be
expected to identify and analyze factors underlying harassment and to for-
mulate proposals for replacing harassment-lawless nonenforcement-with
enforcement of the criminal law. 85
on such motor-drawn vehicles as manure spreaders, Mr. Berol offered to rest
on a pronouncement by Justice of the Peace Alvin Jordan of Lewisboro.
"I will take judicial cognizance," the court held, "that a manure spreader signals
itself for a good half mile." Judge Jordan w%-as once a Maine farm boy.
83. "We have little valid data on the extent of this [harassment] practice." Foote,
Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 34 (1957).
A high degree of visibility occasionally results from public statements by the police
department. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 16, 1957, p. 67, col. 1.
Low visibility may in part be attributed to the inadequacy of remedies for the harassee
or penalities for the harasser or the difficulties of establishing the tort. On false imprison-
ment and false arrest, see RESTATEmENT, Tors §§ 35, 127 (1934). On the duty to enforce
as a defense to the action, see Dussault v. Condon, 339 P.2d 896, 897 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959). However, an action for false imprisonment may succeed, though the damages
awarded may make it a Pyrrhic victory, if police intent not to invoke further the criminal
process results in failing to take the prisoner before a magistrate without delay or in
releasing the arrestee without taking him before a judicial officer at any time. See Hall,
The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. Ci. L REv. 345,
354-63 (1936); 1 HAPER & JsAms, ToRxs §§ 3.6-.9, 4.11-.12 (1956). And see, e.g., Kyv.
Cmam. CoDE § 46(1) (Carroll Supp. 1953); Coxx. GEN. STAT. § 6-49 (1958).
In addition to these "civil remedies" many jurisdictions have a criminal "remedy" on
the books for the offense of "false imprisonment." See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police
Violations of Individual Rights, 39 M=N. L. REv. 493, 494 (1955).
For harassment as a ground for suspension or dismissal from the police force, see, e.g.,
ATLANTA, GA., PoLIcE DE'T RuLEs & REzs. rule 511 (1958) which provides that "any
Policeman who shall be convicted of using his office with malice to oppress or persecute,
or annoy any person or persons, may be suspended or dismissed from the Force." (Empha-
sis added.)
84. See Foote, supra note 83, at 500-02, 504-08. But see Thompson v. City of Louisville,
cert. granted, 360 U.S. 916 (1959) (No. 884, 1958 Term; renumbered No. 59, 1952 Term),
N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1960, p. 14, col. 1 (Supreme Court hears allegations of police harass-
ment on appeal from $10 Police Court convictions; no right of state court reiew became
of size of fine, or action for false arrest unless acquitted under state law).
85. By viewing harassment as "lawlessness in law enforcement," see 4 NATIO.;AL
Cosi'fN oN LAw OBSERVANCE AND ENFoRcEmENT, Sm. 2, Raoar 11, LAwLEss.Ss IN
LAW FNToRcEmENT (1931), rather than as a failure to enforce the law, exposure of many
of the secondary implications of such activity is hindered. As a result, effective methods
for exerting pressure on the police to curtail such activity have been overlooked. See text
following note 90 infra.
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Investigators for an Appraisal and Review Board in this jurisdiction would
discover, for example, a mixture of enforcement and harassment in a police
program designed to regulate the gambling operations of mutual-numbers syn-
dicates.8 6 The enforcement phase is conducted by a highly trained unit of less
than a dozen men who diligently gather evidence in order to prosecute and
convict syndicate operators of conspiracy to violate the gambling laws. This
specialized unit, which operates independently of and without the knowledge
of other officers, conducts all its work within the due-process boundaries of
fidl enforcement. Consequently, the conviction rate is high for charges based
upon its investigations. The harassment phase is conducted by approximately
sixty officers who tour the city and search on sight, because of prior informa-
tion, or such telltale actions as carrying a paper bag, a symbol of the trade,
persons who they suspect are collecting bets. They question the "suspect" and
proceed to search him, his car, or home without first making a valid arrest
to legalize the search. If gambling paraphernalia are found, the police, fully
aware that the exclusionary rule prohibits its use as evidence in this juris-
diction, confiscate the "contraband" and arrest the individual without any in-
tention of seeking application of the criminal law.
87
Gambling operators treat the harassment program as a cost of doing busi-
ness, "a risk of the trade." Each syndicate retains a bonding firm and an
86. Betting on the numbers is a poor man's hobby. Wagers are for small amounts-
may be for as low as a nickel or a dime, although occasionally an affluent player
may invest $100 on a number .... [T]he player places his bet on any combination
of three numbers. He wins if the three numbers he has chosen correspond to three
numbers appearing in the same order in a previously designated portion of the
day's parimutuel betting total at a selected race track.
The usual payoff is at 600 to 1. However, the player usually gets only 500 to 1,
the remaining 100 being kept as commission by the man who took his bet. In
addition, the policy operators lower the odds further on the most popular numbers
and those that have won most frequently. Actually, the player should receive 999
to 1 odds, because that represents the number of possible winning combinations.
There is a business hierarchy in the conduct of numbers gambling. Low man
in the operation is the "runner," often an elevator operator, a doorman, an orderly
in a large hospital, a worker in a factory or office, a housewife or just a plain
out-of-work guy who picks up bets from customers on his beat. Players also
can make their wagers in candy stores, bars; restaurants and other retail estab-
lishments, known as "drops."
Bets made with runners and at drops are picked up by an employe called a
collector. He brings the slips with their bets to a controller, who can be likened to the
branch manager of a bank. The controller in turn delivers the slips to the "bank,"
which is headquarters of the betting ring.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1960, § 4, p. 6, cols. 5-6 (description of current practices in New
York).
For a description of the numbers racket during another era and its relation to bribery
and corruption of the police, see Whyte, The Social Structure of Racketeering, in PRIN-
CIPLES OF SociooGy 494 (Freedman, Hawley, Landecker, Lenski & Miner rev. ed. 1956).
87. If the searchers uncover only one or two numbers slips, no one is taken into
custody. If an individual attempts to dispose of gambling paraphernalia which he has
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attorney to service members who are arrested. When a "runner" or "bagman"
is absent from his scheduled rounds, routine release procedures are initiated.
The bondsman, sometimes prematurely, checks with the police to determine if
a syndicate man has been detained. If the missing man is in custody, the syndi-
cate's attorney files an application for a writ of habeas corpus and appears be-
fore a magistrate who usually sets bail at a nominal amount and adjourns hear-
ing the -writ, at the request of the police, until the following day. Prior to the
scheduled hearing, the police usually advise the court that they have no in-
tention of proceeding, and the case is closed. Despite the harassee's release,
the police retain the money and gambling paraphernalia. If the items seized
are found in a car, the car is confiscated, with the cooperation of the prose-
cutor, under a nuisance abatement statute. Cars are returned, however, after
the harassee signs a "consent decree" and, pursuant to it, pays "court costs"
-a fee which is based on the car's value and which the prosecutor calls "the
real meat of the harassment program."88 The "decree," entered under a pro-
cedure devised by the court and prosecutor's office, enjoins the defendant from
engaging in illegal activity and, on paper, frees the police from any tort lia-
bility by an acknowledgment that seizure of the vehicle was lawful and justi-
fied--even though one prosecutor has estimated that approximately eighty
per cent of the searches and seizures were illegal. A prosecuting attorney
responsible for car confiscation initially felt that such procedures "in the
ordinary practice of law would be unethical, revolting, and shameful," but
explained that he now understands why he acted as he did:
To begin with ... the laws in... [this state] with respect to gambling
are most inadequate. This is equally true of the punishment feature of
the law. To illustrate... a well-organized and productive gambling house
or numbers racket would take in one quarter of a million dollars each
week. If, after a long and vigorous period of investigation and observa-
tion, the defendant was charged with violating the gambling laws and
convicted therefore, the resulting punishment is so obviously weak and
unprohibitive that the defendants are willing to shell out a relatively small
fine or serve a relatively short time in prison. The... [city's] gamblers
and numbers men confidently feel that the odds are in their favor. If they
operate for six months or a year, and accumulate untold thousands of
dollars from the illegal activity, then the meager punishment imposed
upon them if they are caught is well worth it. Then, too, because of the
on his person within the presence of the officers, the police may then proceed to effect
a legal arrest and the evidence may be introduced at trial.
Though the bulk of arrests are labeled "investigative arrests" by the police, there is
no indication that harassment is a device for recruiting informants. Though a "runner"
or "bagman," as'the collector of bets is called, may not lnow that his rights have been vio-
lated or that he is entitled to immediate release, he does know that his syndicate will arrange
an early release and that he will gain nothing by incriminating his "benevolent" and power-
ful associates.
88. For example, "court costs" may be $120 for a 1957 car or $70 for a 1953 model.
Assessments are made even though actual court costs have been estimated at approximately
$20, although the legality of such retribution is in doubt in this state.
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search and seizure laws in . . . [this state], especially in regard to gam-
bling and the number rackets, the hands of the police are tied. Unless a
search can be made prior to an arrest so that the defendant can be caught
in the act of violating the gambling laws, or a search warrant issued, there
is no other earthly way of apprehending such people along with evidence
sufficient to convict them that is admissible in court.
Because of these two inadequacies of the law (slight punishment and
conservative search and seizure laws with regard to gambling) the pros-
ecutor's office and the police department are forced to find other means
of punishing, harassing and generally making life uneasy for gamblers.
This position, fantastic as it is to 'be that of law-trained official, a guardian
of the rule of law, illustrates how extensively only one of many police harass-
ment programs in this jurisdiction can permeate the process and be tolerated
by other decisionmakers in a system of criminal administration where de-
cisions not to enforce are of extremely low visibility.8
Having uncovered such a gambling-control program, an Appraisal and
Review Board should recommend that the police abandon such harassment
activities because they are antagonistic to the rule of law. In addition, the
board might advance secondary reasons for eliminating harassment by expos-
ing the inconsistencies between this program and departmental justifications
for its narcotics and assault policies. While unnecessary to the condemnation
of what is fundamentally lawless nonenforcement, such exposure might cause
the police to question the wisdom of actions 'based on a personal or depart-
89. Some indication of the extensiveness of police harassment in this jurisdiction
can be gleaned from a single precinct's arrest and release statistics on "prostitutes" and
"gamblers." During a six-month period criminal prosecutions were initiated against only
75 out of 3000 women arrested for prostitution and against only 25 out of 600 persons
arrested for gambling. During that same period eighty raids on alleged gambling opera-
tions were staged accounting for more than 580 of the 600 gambling arrests and the con-
fiscation of approximately $9,000 in "gambling money." As for harassment of narcotics
suspects, see text at note 39 supra.
In raids, called "tipovers," the police enter premises, search, seize, and arrest illegally,
fully aware that by resorting to such techniques they are forfeiting a court case. This
harassment policy may partially explain why fewer than thirty search warrants have been
issued annually by the courts in recent.years to the police of the more than dozen precincts
in the city, not just to the police of the precinct described. A member of the prosecutor's
office explained the small number of warrants issued by noting that (1) in cases involving
deadly weapons and narcotics found outside a dwelling place the exclusionary rule does
not apply-though criteria of lawful searches and seizures continue to have in theory
general application; (2) officers wait until they- have sufficient evidence to substantiate
an arrest 'and to conduct a lawful 'search pursuant to an arrest without a warrant, "(3)
by avoiding a search warrant, -officers minimize the chances of leaking information about
a raid; (4) "probable cause"'is difficult to prove; and (5) it is useless to go to the trouble,
time, and expense of obtaining a wariant since it'is so easy to conduct a search without
a warrant. Compare Henry v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. 168, 170 (1959) ("[in the
18th century] police control took the place of judicial control, since no showing of
'probable cause' before a magistrate was required").
On a harassment program initiated by a district attorney, as a "campaign of attrition,
bent on routing the goons out of the Bronx," see FRANK, Drvy OF A D.A. 92 (1960).
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mental belief that the legislature has authorized excessively lenient sanctions
and restrictive enforcement procedures. The comparison might emphasize the
inconsistencies of police policy toward organized crime by exposing the clash
between an informer program designed to rid the city of the "big supplier"
and a harassment program which tends to consolidate control of the numbers
racket in a few syndicates "big" enough to sustain the legal, bonding, and
other "business" costs of continued interruptions and the confiscation of prop-
erty. 0 More importantly, it should cause a reexamination and redefinition of
"workload" which was so significant in the rationalization of the assault
policy. A cost accounting would no doubt reveal that a significant part of
"workload," as presently defined by the police, includes expenditures of pub-
lic funds for personnel and equipment employed in unlawful activities. Once
harassment is perceived by municipal officials concerned with budgets as an
unauthorized expenditure of public funds, Consideration for increased awards
to the police department might be conditioned upon a showing that existing
resources are now deployed for authorized purposes. Such action should stim-
ulate police cooperation in implementing the board's proposal for curtailing
harassment.
Further to effectuate its recommendation, the board might attempt to clarify
and redefine the duties of the police by a reclassification of crimes which
would emphasize the mandate that no more than full enforccnhent of the exist-
ing criminal law as defined -by the legislature is expected. For many crimes,
this may mean little or no actual enforcenent because the values protected
by procedural limitations are more important than the values which may be
infringed by a particular offense. A board might propose, for example, that
crimes be classified not only as felonies and misdemeanors, 91 but in terms of
active and passive police enforcement. An active-cnforccnwint designation for
an offense would mean that individual police officers or specialized squads are
to-be assigned the task of ferreting out and even triggering violations.02 Pas-
90. See also 2 ComM'N oN ORGANIZED CRnn, ABA, OrGAN UzD CanIE AD LAw
ENFORCE-SENr 8 (1953) ("The numbers racket [in another state] is said to have continued
unchanged, still with the participation of interstate racketeers, under the constant harass-
ment of local police and prosecutors.").
A member of the special squad, in the jurisdiction studied, which is responsible for
developing conspiracy cases against the syndicate believes, however, that harassment diverts
the attention of syndicate members away from the activities of the conspiracy squad, and
thus facilitates its "lawful" operations.
,91. The desirability of retaining the felony-misdemeanor classification is beyond the
scope of this Article. For a decision, following a reemamination, to retain this classifi-
cation, see MoDEL PENAL CODE § 1.04 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), 1.05, comment (Tent.
Draft No.'2,1954).
92. The outer limits on "triggering" would, of course, be determined by judicial con-
struction of the requirements of due process, particularly in relation to entrapment. See
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); McDermett v. United States, 93 A.2d
287, 290 (D.C. Miun. Ct. App. 1953) (reversing assault conviction) :
... An officer of the law . . . has the duty of preventing not encouraging
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sive enfdrcement would mean that the police are to assume a sit-back-and-
wait posture, i.e., that .they invoke the criminal process only when the disturb-
ing event is brought to their attention by personal observation during a rou-
tine tour of duty or by someone outside the police force registering a com-
plaint.95 Designation of gambling, for example, as a passive-enforcement of-
fense would officially apprise the police that substantial expenditures of per-
sonnel and equipment for enforcement are not contemplated unless the local
community expresses a low tolerance for such disturbing events by constantly
bringing them to police attention. The adoption of this or a similar classifica-
tion scheme might not only aid in training the police to understand that
harassment is unlawful, but it may also provide the legislature with a device
for officially allowing local differences in attitude toward certain offenses to
be reflected in police practice and for testing the desirability of removing
criminal sanctions from certain kinds of currently proscribed behavior.
VI
The mandate of full enforcement, under circumstances which compel selec-
tive enforcement, has placed the (municipal police in an intolerable position.
As a result, nonenforcement programs have developed undercover, in a hit-
or-miss fashion, and without regard to impact on the overall administration
of justice or the basic objectives of the criminal law. Legislatures, therefore,
ought to reconsider what discretion, if any, the police must or should have in
invoking the criminal process, and what devices, if any, should be designed
to increase visibility and hence reviewability of these police decisions,
The ultimate answer is that the police should not be delegated discretion
not to invoke the criminal law. It is recognized, of course, that the exercise
of discretion cannot be completely eliminated where human beings are in-
volved. The frailties of human language and human perception will always ad-
mit of borderline cases (although none of the situations analyzed in this Arti-
cle are ".borderline"). But nonetheless, outside this margin of ambiguity, the
police should operate in an atmosphere which exhorts and c6mmands them to in-
voke impartially all criminal laws within the bounds of fidl enforcemcn. 94 If a
crime.... [He] should not be permitted to "torment and tease weak men beyond
their power to resist."
We do not say the police officer was guilty of entrapment. But the evidence
may be tested as if entrapment were claimed .... When ... the police officer..
has by his own insidious conduct, by patient and clever encouragement, and by
setting the stage for a furtive homosexual gesture, placed himself in the position
of consenting, he 'should not be heard'to .say of the accused, "ie assaulted me."
93. Certain crimes such as homicide and rape would by their very nature requlre,
passive-enforcement designations. On the other hand, gambling, prostitution, narcotics,
and homosexual offenses, for example, could be given either enforcement designation.
94. This, of course, does not mean that the police must arrest every violator. On tie
meaning of full enforcement, see notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
For an example of a statute under which full enforcemnent might mean no more than
the issuance of a warning to the offender, see Street Offences Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c.
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criminal law is ill-advised, poorly defined, or too costly to enforce, efforts by
the -police to achieve full enforcement should generate pressures for legislative
action.95 Responsibility for the enactment, amendment, and repeal of the crim-
inal laws will not, then, be abandoned to the whim of each police officer or
department, 6 but retained where it belongs in a democracy-with elected
representatives.
9 7
Equating actiua enforcement with full enforccmCnt, however, would be
57, § 2. In accord with this section the Home Office issued a circular stating the pro-
cedure to be adopted by the Metropolitan Police, which provides, inter alia:
On the first occasion when a woman who has not previously been convicted of
loitering or soliciting for the purpose of prostitution is seen loitering or soliciting
in a street or public place for that purpose, the officer seeing her will obtain the
assistance of a second officer as a witness, and when both officers, after having
kept the woman under observation, are satisfied by her demeanour and conduct
that she is in fact loitering or soliciting for the purpose of prostitution, they
will tell her what they have seen and caution her. Details of the caution will
subsequently be recorded at the police station and in a central register for the
Metropolitan Police District. The two officers, after administering the caution,
will ask the woman if she is willing to be put in touch with a moral welfare organiza-
tion or a probation officer, and invite her to call at the police station at a
convenient time to see a woman police officer for these arrangements to be made,
unless she prefers her name and address to be given to a welfare organization
or a probation officer without going to the station. If the woman continues to
loiter or solicit for the purpose of prostitution, a second formal caution will be
given in the street and recorded and a second offer will be made to put her in
touch with a welfare officer or probation officer. She will not be arrested until
she is seen loitering or soliciting on the third occasion.
G.B. Home Office Circular No. 109/1959, Aug. 13, 1959, reprinted in 23 J. Cmau. LAw
(Eng.) 299 (1959).
95. Essentially this position was taken and the result achieved by New York City's
police commissioner when in 1955 he declared that bingo would be treated as a violation
of the state's gambling laws, that "anyone who goes ahead with bingo in this city does
so at his peril . . . . If people do not like it they should take the necessary steps to
repeal it. But while it is on the books, we [policemen] must enforce it." N.Y. Times,
Sept. 26, 1955, p. 25, col. 8. The New York legislature responded by legalizing bingo
conducted by religious, charitable, veterans, volunteer firemen, and similar nonprofit
organizations. N.Y. Muxic. LAw §§ 477-99. On the stringent set of rules promulgated
for the conduct of legalized bingo by the State Lottery Control Commission to keep the
game out of the hands of racketeers, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1958, p. 35, cols. 1-2.
Pressures for the repeal of obsolete laws, however, may not develop, for they may, as
suggested-in ARNOLD, THE SYmBOLS Oi GovmNuENr 160 (1935), "survive in order to
satisfy moral objections to established modes of conduct. They are unenforced because
we want to continue our conduct, and unrepealed because we want to preserve our morals."
A program of full enfdrcement of existing statutes would alter this equation, unless such
laws were reclassified as passive enforcement offenses.
96. As presently organized many police departments have forces of several hundred
men or more. In fact, some fifteen cities have more than 1,000 men, with New York City's
force of nearly 23,000 at the top of the list. See 27 U.S. FBI, DEP'T OF JusTicr, UNIFornL
Camz REPoRTs 25-30 (1956). Size alone indicates the unlikelihood of the uniform
application of the criminal law were the police to be granted discretion. Vhen this
fact is coupled with the caliber of men attracted to police service and the quality of
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neither workable nor humane nor humanly possible under present conditions
in most, if not all, jurisdictions. Even if there were "enough police" (and
there are not) to enforce all of the criminal laws, too many people have come
to rely on the nonenforcement of too many "obsolete" laws to justify the
embarrassment, discomfort, and misery which would follow implementation of
full enforcement programs for every crime. Full enforcement is a program for
the future, a program which could be initiated with the least hardship when the
states, perhaps stimulated by the work of the American Law Institute, enact
new criminal codes clearing the books of obsolete offenses.98
In the interim, legislatures should establish Policy Appraisal and Review
Boards not only to facilitate coordination of municipal police policies with
those of other key criminal law administrators, but also to assist commissions
drafting new codes in reappraising basic objectives of the criminal law and
in identifying laws which have become obsolete. To ensure that board ap-
praisals and recommendations facilitate the integration of police policies with
overall state policies and to ensure the cooperation of local authorities, board
membership might include the state's attorney general, the chief justice of the
supreme court, the chairman of the department of correction, the chairman
of the board of parole and the chief of parole supervision, the chairman of
,the department of probation, the chairmen of the judiciary committees of the
legislature, the chief of the state police, the local chief of police, the local
prosecutor, and the chief judge of each of the local trial courts.90 In order
regularly and systematically to cull and retrieve information, the board should
be assisted by a full-time director who has a staff of investigators well-trained
their training, any expectation that their exercise of discretion would adequately take
into account the impact of their decisions throughout the process would be unwarranted.
Conceivably, a department could be organized, free of such duties as traffic regulation,
whose sole function would be criminal law enforcement. Such a police force might be
sufficiently small and well-trained so that each of its members could develop an expertise
which would justify a delegation of discretion. Were such a force constituted provision
would still have to be made for reviewing its activities, as is desirable at all points ill the
process where discretion is exercised.
97. See District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 113-14 (1953)
("The failure of the executive branch to enforce a law does not result in its modification
or repeal .... The repeal of laws is as much a legislative function as their enactment.")
98. Within the last few years Louisiana and Wisconsin enacted new criminal codes,
LA. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:1-:402 (1950); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.01-953.00 (1958).
Illinois and Puerto Rico, for example, have set up commissions to draft new criminal
codes and other jurisdictions no doubt will be encouraged to reexamine their criminal
laws, as the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute nears completion.
99. The composition of the board might vary in size and personnel to meet local
needs. It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to detail the table of organization
of such a Board and its staff.
Conceivably, without further legislative action such a board might be constituted in
California:
The Attorney-General may, from time to time, and as often as occasion may require,
call into conference the district attorneys and sheriffs of the several counties
and the chiefs of police of the several municipalities of this State, or such of them
as he may deem advisable, for the purpose of discussing the duties of their re-
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in social science research techniques. It should be given power to subpoena
persons and records and to assign investigators to observe all phases of police
activity including routine patrols, bookings, raids, and contacts with both the
courts and the prosecutor's office. 100 To clarify its functions, develop proce-
dures, determine personnel requirements and test the idea itself, the board's
jurisdiction should initially be restricted to one or two major municipalities
in the state. The board would review, appraise, and make recommendations
concerning municipal police nonenforcement policies as well as follow up and
review the consequences of implemented proposals. In order to make its job
both manageable and less subject to attack by those who cherish local auton-
omy and who may see the establishment of a ,board as a step toward centraliza-
tion,101 it would have solely an advisory function and limit its investigations to
the enforcement of state laws, not municipal ordinances. And to ensure that
board activity will not compromise current enforcement campaigns or place
offenders on notice of new techniques of detection or sources of information,
boards should be authorized, with court approval, to withhold specified reports
from general publication for a limited and fixed time.
Like other administrative agencies, a Policy Appraisal and Review Board
will in time no doubt suffer from marasmus and outlive its usefulness. But
while viable, such a board has an enormous potential for uncovering in a very
dramatic fashion basic inadequacies in the administration of criminal justice
and for prompting a thorough community reexamination of the why of a law
of crimes.
spective offices, with the viev of uniform and adequate enforcement of the laws of
this state ....
CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 12523.
For various suggestions for the establishment of administrative agencies for the
supervision of criminal law enforcement, see GLuEcx, CRME AND JusTics 248-53 (1936);
Model Department of Justice Act and Commentary, in 2 Coam'z; o,; ORGANizED Cmmlu,
ABA, ORGANIZE C ~E AND LAWv EN-FORCEMENT app. 2, at 93-133 (1953) ; Model Police
Council Act and Commentary, in 2 id. app. 3, at 135-56.
100. See, e.g., the investigative authority of the Temporary State Commission of
Invesitgation, N.Y. UNcoNsoL. LAws §§ 7051-57 (Mclinney 1953, Supp. 1959).
101. "Any attempt to centralize the law enforcement agencies of the state is confronted
at the outset by a long held public sentiment that puts great store by a local law enforcement
system close to the people." AuMANN & WALKER, THE GOy muxnT A.,.D A wNiSTmA-
TioN OF OHIo 219 (1956). See Address of Welcome by [Then] Governor W~arren to the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, in THE PoLIcs YEAPxOoK 3, 5-6 (1953);
MacNanara, American. Police Administration at Jfid-Centur,, 10 Pun. AD.u. RM. 181,
184 (1950). See also Hoy, The Police Specialist in District Stations, June 1958, ch. III.
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APPENDIX I
A NOTE ON STIGMA, STATUS DEGRADATION, AND STATUS ELEVATION CEREMONIES IN TIE
'CRIMINAL PROCESS
The criminal process, from arrest through release, is comprised of a series of "status
degradation ceremonies." A status degradation ceremony is "any communicative work
between persons whereby the public entity of an actor is transformed into something
looked on as lower in the social scheme of social types." Garfinkel, Conditions of Success-
ful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 Am. J. SocIoLoGY 420 (1956). As a result of the redefini-
tion of individual status which accompanies being labelled "accused," "convict," or "ex-
convict," many releasees pay the penalty for their offenses and suspected offenses on a
never ending installment plan.
Many men on their release carry their prison about with them into the air, and
hide it as a secret disgrace in their hearts, and at length, like poor poisoned things,
creep into some hold and die. It is wretched that they should have to do so ....
Society takes upon itself the right to inflict appalling punishment on the individual,
but it also has the supreme vice of shallowness, and fails to realize what it has done.
When a man's punishment is over, it leaves him to himself; .that is to say, it aban-
dons him at the very moment when its highest duty towards him begins. It is really
ashamed of its own actions, and shuns those whom it has punished, as people shun
a creditor whose debt they cannot pay, or one on whom they have inflicted an irre-
parable, an irredeemable wrong.
WILDE, DE PROFUNDIS 26-27 (1905). Employers are reluctant to hire persons with arrest
or conviction records. See Williams v. New York, 8 Misc. 2d 390, 391-92, 168 N.Y.S.2d
163, 165-66 (Ct. Cl. 1957), aff'd, 5 App. Div. 2d 936, 172 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1958) (mem.) :
The claimant is entitled to an award for the unlawful detention beyond the 5-year
maximum period, i.e., 1 year, 6 months, and 24 days served in prison; 7 months and
25 days served as parole.
In fixing the amount of the award it is necessary to look into his earning capacity
at the times when he was free on parole, taking into consideration the fact that cm-
ploynwut is neither plentiful iwr hcrative for a parolee as it is for others. Also In
fixing the award consideration must be given for loss of liberty and for the humilia-
tion and the indignity suffered while in prison and the restriction of unlawful parole.
In granting an award on these intangibles the conduct of the claimant on parole and
his desire to remain at large must be reviewed and evaluated.
(Emphasis added.) Accord, Frym, The Treatment of Recidivists, 47 J. Canm. L., C. & P.S.
1 (1956); Lykke, Attitude of Bonding Companies Toward Probationers and Parolees,
Federal Probation, Dec. 1957, p. 36. Persons convicted of certain crimes may not hold
union office. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, § 504, 73 Stat. 536,
29 U.S.C.A. § 504 (Supp. 1959). For congressional focusing on the arrest records of union
officials, see, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities
in the Labor or Management Field, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 13, at 4981-82 (1957).
On the stigma which attaches to the label "juvenile delinquent," see Jones v. Common-
wealth, 185 Va. 335, 341-42, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946) :
The stain against him is not removed merely because the statute says no judg-
ment in this particular proceeding shall be deemed a conviction for crime or so con-
sidered. The stigma of conviction will reflect upon him for life. It hurts his self
respect. It may, at some inopportune, unfortunate moment, rear its ugly head to
destroy his opportunity for advancement, and blast his ambition to build up a char-
acter and reputation entitling him to the esteem and respect of his fellowman.
Accord, McKay, The Neighborhood and Child Conduct, in PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLooy 486,
492 (Freedman, Hawley, Landecker, Lenski & Miner rev. ed. 1956). On the stigmatic
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freight of the ascription "convict" to an offender on probation, see United States v. Pen-
dergast, 28 F. Supp. 601, 608 (W.D. Mo. 1939). On the increased stigma accompanying
multiple convictions and its impact on the length of sentence imposed for any one sentence,
even though the sentences are to run concurrently, see United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d
561, 563 (2d Cir. 1.958). On the forfeiture of a variety of civil rights which may attend
conviction see, e.g., Kelly v. Municipal Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 38, 324 P2d 990 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1958) ; Widdifield, The State Convict, 1951 (unpublished graduate thesis in Yale Law
Library).
Police manuals frequently reflect or reenforce the stigma which attaches to the releasee
by instructing (a) patrolmen to
observe the conduct of all known criminals and bad characters, making such obser-
vations as will enable him to identify them at any time [and] ... in particular [to
observe] their actions and the places they frequent . . . and report all pertinent
facts to his commanding officer.
SAN FA-Ncisco, CAL, Poxca Dan'r RuLEs & RxEs. § 206, at 43 (1951); or (b) the
Sergeant to
give particular attention to beer taverns, pool halls, rooming houses, bowling alleys,
dance halls and other places where bootleggers, gamblers, prostitutes, thieves and
narcotic addicts may congregate, and shall use every lawful means to suppress,
imprison, or drive them from the City.
Sioux Crry, IowA, PoLicE DEm'T MANUAL p. 54, § 3 (1956).
However, some manuals provide that
Members shall not taunt or persecute ex-convicts. When a convicted man has paid
his penalty for his offense, he is entitled to start life anew and should receive en-
couragement and cooperation from the police in his efforts to live a law-abiding
life.
PoRmAxD, " M., PoLicE DEp'T RuLEs & REGS. § 1135.03 (reprinted in WSoN, POLICM
PLA"NING 375 (2d ed. 1957)). One manual, the SALT LAxE Crry, UTAH, PoLice l' iuAL
§§ 32, at 34; 38, at 86-87 (1951), contains both the San Francisco and the Portland
types of instruction.
One of the crucial problems facing the administration of criminal justice is how to
establish release procedures which in practice become stat us-elcvatioan ceremonies. Dis-
charge from parole or from prison should carry with it, in appropriate situations, the
kinds of redefinitions upward that are associated, for example, with graduation from high
school or college, honorable discharge from the armed services, successful completion of
apprenticeship in a trade or admission to a profession. Some ceremony or series of cere-
monies must be devised to redefine the social status of releasees so that the public will be-
gin to entertain a presumption that a person honorably discharged (as opposed to neutral-
ly discharged or possibly even dishonorably discharged) from the correctional service is
ready to take his place as a law-abiding citizen in the community. Were such a ceremony
or ceremonies created, effective tpressure might be placed on correctional authorities to
test and carry out rehabilitation programs and to develop a meaningful system of com-
munication with the public. The late Professor Dession, in his draft of the Puerto Rican
Correction Code, recognized this problem, but his solution was the elimination of status-
degradation ceremonies entirely from the criminal process. He proposed the "discard of
the nomenclature of punishment" because, inter alia,
Designation as a "criminal" pursuant to the former law carried a stigma com-
pounded of an accretion through time of forgotten as well as recorded rationaliza-
tions for the expression of unconscious as well as conscious psychological drives
and practices involving the venting of hatred, the release of tensions engendered
by feelings of fear, guilt and anxiety, and a frequently unrational selection of scape-
goats for those purposes.
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Proposed Puerto Rico Code of Correction, pt. 1, § 5(2) (d) (Dession draft mimeo [un-
dated]) Query: Does Dession's proposal overemphasize the extent to which the uncon-
scious can or should be taken into account by the law?
Among existing criminal procedures, the pardon seems to come closest, at times, to
function at least in theory as a staits-elevation ceremony. For a recent case where par-
don was sought and granted to remove stigma, see Pa. Bd. Pardons, Rccommendation
in -re Application of Jacob Meoey, [1957] 4 PA. LESIswATivE J. app. 401.1:,
Because he has turned from his criminal activity and has turned to a legitimate
activity [associated with a real estate company] for more than four and one-half
years, we feel that he should not be further burdened with his prior conduct. [To
become wholly successful, it is necessary for him to have a real estate license for
which the conviction makes him ineligible.] He is married and has two. children
and he desires a pardon in order to clear his name for their benefit. He lives in a
fine residential section ... and this offense would carry a certain stigma with It.
See also CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1203.4, which provides in pertinent part:
Every defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of his probation . . . , shall at any
time thereafter be permitted by the court to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter
a plea of not guilty; or if he has been convicted after a plea of not guilty, the court
shall set aside the verdict of guilty; and in either case the court shall thereupon
dismiss the accusations or information against such defendant, who shall thereafter
be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime
of which he has been convicted. . . . provided, that in any subsequent prosecution
of such defendant for any other offense, such prior conviction may be pleaded and
proved and shall have the same effect as if probation had not been granted or the
accusation or information dismissed.
Probation, however, may not be granted to inter alia, any defendant
.. . convicted of robbery, burglary, burglary with explosives, rape with force or
violence, arson, murder, assault with intent to commit murder, attempt to commit
murder, train wrecking, kidnaping, escape from a state prison, conspiracy to com-
mit any one or more of the aforementioned felonies . ...
CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1203. This "pardon" statute, furthermore, has been very narrow-
ly construed. See, e.g., Kelly v. Municipal Court, supra.
APPENDIX II
A NOTE ON HOLDING THE POLICE ACCOUNTABLE FOR "NEGLECT OF DUTY"
Police manuals commonly contain sections providing for.departmental disciplinary ac-
tion against its members for "neglect of duty." See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL, POLICE DEP'T
REGS. app. at 1 (1956) ; BOSTON, IASS., POuCE DEP' RULES & REGs. rule 54, § 2(a) & n.
(1950) ; DETROIT, MICH., REV. POLICE MANUAL ch. 10, § 106, 129 (1958). Manuals ordi-
narily expressly require department members to report facts or information relative to a
criminal offense. See, e.g., ATLANTA, GA., POLICE DEI"T RULES & REGS. rule 564 (1958);
DES MOINES, IOWA, PoLic. DEr'T RULES & REGs. ch. 2, § 209 [undated]; MIAMI, FLA.,
POLICE tMANUAL rule 29, § 3 (1956). Failure to report a known violation of law or infor-
mation useful to the department may be presumptive neglect of duty. E.g., NEW BEDoR,
MASS., -PoucE DEr'T RULES & REGS. rule 15, § 3 (1957); WHEELING, W. VA., POLICE
DEP'T RULES & REGs. § 28 [undated]. Some police manuals designate failure to detect a
violation of laws within a policeman's area of responsibility presumptive neglect of duty
or a separate offense. E.g., NEw HAVEN, CONN., POLIC ,SERv. DEI"T MANUAL rule 33, § 1
(n) (1953) (separate offense) ; PROVIDENCE, RjI., 'POLICE DEP'T RULES & RE-s. rule 1, § 1
(24) (1942) (separate offense).
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Other police manuals designate failure of a department member to detect and/or prevent
repeated. violations of laws within his area of responsibility as a departmental offense.
E.g.,MLnAuKEE, XVis., PoLc DEP'T Ru_.Es & REs. rule 14, § 12 (1932); PRovzo.Fc%
RI., POLICE DE'T RuIas & R._s. rule IX, § 42 (1942).
For a series of cases defining the "permissible scope" of judicial review of civil service
commission decisions to discharge police officers for neglect of duty, accepting bribes, etc.,
see Nolting v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 7 Ill. App. 2d 147, 129 N.E2d 236 (1955); Foreman
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 7 Ill, App. 2d 122, 129 N.E2d 245 (1955); Martin v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 7 Ill. App. 2d 128, 129 N.E.2d 248 (1955) ; Watkins v. Civil Semv. Comm'n, 7
Ill. App. 2d 140, 129 N.E.2d 254 (1955) ; McCaffery v. Civil Serv. Bd., 7 Ill. App. 2d 164,
129 N.E.2d 257 (1955).
On neglect of duty as a common law and statutory crime and as a basis for discharge
from office, see4 U. FLA. L. REv. 264 (1951); 'Note, 20 N.C.L. REv. 110 (1941). On failure
to arrest for an offense committed in a police officer's presence as a misdemeanor, see, e.g.,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-143 (1952), McDermett v. United States, 98 A.2d 287, 289 (D.C.
Mun. Ct. App. 1953). Most of the reported cases, whether they involve a criminal indict-
ment, discharge, or a petition for writ of mandamus to enforce, illustrate the difficulty of
establishing neglect and the inadequacy of departmental as well as judicial control of the
police even if the failures to enforce are gross and highly visible. For a sampling of reported
cases in this area see Sullivan v. Leatherman, 48 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1950) (sheriff indicted
for neglect of duty, knowingly permitting gambling laws of state to be violated in open
and notorious manner, indictment held void); People ex rel. Churchill v. Greene, 104
App. Div. 496, 93 N.Y. Supp. 720 (1905) (discharge upheld for failure to report and
close some thirty houses of prostitution in one precinct, many of "a notorious character") ;
People ex rel. Jansen v. City of Park Ridge, 7 Ill. App. 2d 331, 129 N.E.2d 438 (1955),
in which a taxpayer's petition for writ of mandamus to compel mayor and chief of police
to enforce parking ordinances was dismissed, for
... the duty... is not of such a character that the court can prescribe a definite
act or series of acts which will constitute a performance of that duty .... Manda-
Mrus will not lie where to issue the writ would put into the hands of the court the
control and regulatioh of the general course of official conduct or enforcement or
enforce the performance of official duties generally.
Id. at 332-33, 129 N.E2d at 439. Concerning writs of mandamus to compel police action,
see State ex rel. Beardslee v. Landes, 149 Wash. 570, -71 Pac. 829 (1928) (mandamus not
available to compel police to enforce parking regulations) ; State v. McFeeley, 136 N.J.L.
102, 54 A2d'797 (Sup. Ct 1947) ; State v. Jenkins, 136 N.J.L. 112, 54 A.2d 804 (Sup.
Ct 1947); State v. McGovern, 136 N.J.L. 115, 54 A2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
For cases reviewing police decisions of low visibility see, e.g., Armbruster v. City of
iddletown, 74 Ohio App. 321, 58 N.E.2d 778 (1944) (upholding discharge of patrolman
who, contrary to regulations, failed to file written report of suspicious incident) ; In the
Matter of Schuppe, 1 App. Div. 2d 912, 149 N.Y.S2d 535 (1956) (mem.) (affirming
dismfssal of police officer who was "active moving party in the sale" of stolen property
and who failed to report information concerning the offense and to arrest persons with
whom he participated in the crime) ; Mullen v. Ziegener, 134 N.J.L. 207, 46 A.2d 783
(Sup. Ct. 1946) (similar charge, patrolman reinstated because his decision %as consistent
with honest judgment and disciplinary action was apparently spite-motivated). The small
number of reported cases may in part be attributed to the difficult evidentiary problems of
establishing the police officer's knowledge of the criminal activity neglected. See, e.g.,
State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 106 A.2d 541 (1954) (insufficient evidence to establish
knowledge) ; State v. Marchese, 14 N.J. 16, 101 A2d 13 (1953) (sufficient evidence) ;
State v. Witte, 13 N.J. 598, 100 A.2d 754 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 951 (1954)
(sufficient evidence). In any event, this sparsity of cases is consistent with the view
expressed in SmrrH, POLICE SYsrTss IN THE UNITE STAMS 146-57, 204-32 (rev. ed.
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1949), that internal departmental controls, whether under civil service or not, are not fully
implemented. There is need for a full scale study of departmental trials and the extent to
which disciplinary- action follows, for example, a court's finding that an arrest or a search
was unlawful. See note 14 .supra. For a general discussion of disciplinary proceedings, see
RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW §§ 6-4, 8-36 to 42 (1957).
The California constitution empowers the attorney general to supervise enforcement
of all state laws and to order local lav enforcement officers to report, whenever he deems
advisable, on the investigation, detection, prosecution and punishment of crime.
Whenever in the opinion of the Attorney General any law of the State is not
being adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the Attorney
General to prosecute any violations of law of which the superior court shall have
jurisdiction ....
CAL. CONST. art. 5, § 21. The attorney general has apparently used these powers sparingly.
DEUTSCH, THE TROUBLE WITH Cops 198-201 (1955). On the power and limitations
of state attorneys general to supervise law enforcement activities, see COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, THE PowERs, DUTIES, AND OPERATIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS' GENERAL
OFFICE 8 (1951) ; Comment, Disorganization of Metropolitan Law Enforcement and Some
Proposed Solutions, 43 J. CiM. L., C. & P.S. 63, 72 (1952).
Legislative investigations, grand jury presentments, police surveys, crime commissions
and newspaper reports are additional hit-and-miss devices for exposing or reviewing
police decisions not to invoke the criminal process. On legislative investigations, see,
e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMM. ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EX-
ECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, 81ST CONG., 2D SESS., INTERIM REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT OF Hom"o-
SEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT (Comm. Print 1950) :
It was also discovered that most of the homosexuals apprehended by the police in
the District of Columbia were booked on charges of disorderly conduct. In most
cases they were never brought to trial but were allowed to make forefeitures of
small cash collateral at police stations. This slipshod method of disposing of these
cases with little or na review by the prosecutive or judicial authorities was corrected
after the subcommittee brought this situation to the attention of the judge of the
municipal court in August 1950.
(Emphasis added.)
On duty of police to testify before grand jury see Christal v. Police Comm'n, 33
Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P2d 416 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939). On report of Hudson County, N.J.,
grand jury presentment charging West New York, N.J., police department with ineffective
detection of violators, see N.Y. Times, April 8, 1958, p. 23, col. 3. On community sentiment
as a means of police control, see WILSON, POLICE PLANNING 48 (2d ed. 1957). On
newspaper disclosures, see note 15 supra.
In towns and small cities police decisions not to invoke or enforce the criminal law
are likely to be made visible because knowledge of disturbing events which are of lower
frequency than in large cities is likely to be more widespread and the local newspapers,
always searching for a local story, "have a pressing daily need for fresh news." See
Gleason, Policing the Smaller Cities, 291 ANNALS 14, 17 (1954).
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